high match confidence
Sentence-level differences:
- Reworded sentence: "Because our products are primarily manufactured internationally, the import of our products may be affected by changes in applicable tariffs."
- Added sentence: "In addition, there may be further changes in U.S."
- Added sentence: "trade policy given the change in the presidential administration."
- Reworded sentence: "Trade Representative ("USTR") enacted various tariffs of 7.5%, 10%, 15% and 25% on imports into the U.S."
- Added sentence: "USTR has continued to expand these tariffs recently announcing new tariffs of up to 100% on certain products."
Current (2025):
Because our products are primarily manufactured internationally, the import of our products may be affected by changes in applicable tariffs. Our products are primarily manufactured in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Mexico, and we also procure some of our products directly from China.…
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Because our products are primarily manufactured internationally, the import of our products may be affected by changes in applicable tariffs. Our products are primarily manufactured in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Mexico, and we also procure some of our products directly from China. In February 2025, the U.S. government scheduled 25% tariffs to be imposed on products of Mexican origin. Although subsequent discussions between the President of the United States and the President of Mexico have resulted in an agreement to temporarily defer the effective date for these tariffs, this policy may be reversed at any time. In addition, imports of products manufactured in Malaysia and/or Vietnam may be targeted for U.S. tariff increases in light of the increased trade imbalances between the United States and these countries, which has increased significantly in the past decade as manufacturing operations have increasingly moved to these countries due to strained U.S.-China trade relations. An increase in trade-related costs associated with these imports may impair the profitability of such international production, may strain our suppliers’ ability to provide inputs necessary for the production of these items, and may otherwise affect our manufacturing partners’ ability to provide our products at previously contracted prices. We also may not be able to pass on the full burden of the increase in trade-related costs to our partners and/or customers which could impact our profitability and/or our competitiveness. Our products may also be subject to further increased U.S. or international tariffs as a result of the outbreak of and escalation in international trade wars between the U.S., China, Mexico and other countries. In response to the February 2025 U.S. government tariffs scheduled on goods of Canadian, Mexican, and Chinese origin, all three affected countries announced plans to implement retaliatory measures including new tariffs on certain U.S. goods, and, in the case of China, new export controls on certain critical metal items. The U.S. tariffs on Canadian and Mexican origin products and the Canadian and Mexican tariffs on U.S. origin products has been suspended for a period of 30 days pursuant to agreements between the U.S. government and the Canadian and Mexican governments, pending further negotiations between these countries. Such 40 40 40 agreements and negotiations may fail and result in the imposition of new trade measures between any or all of these countries and the United States. The February 2025 U.S. government executive orders scheduling the tariff increases on goods of Canadian, Mexican, and Chinese origin also included provisions allowing for further escalation of tariffs in the event affected countries implement retaliatory measures. Such increases could result in the imposition of extreme tariff or non-tariff measures, which may lead to a breakdown in international supply chains due to increased tariff costs and disruptions in the availability of goods. There is currently significant uncertainty about the future relationship between the United States, and various other countries, most significantly China, Canada and Mexico, with respect to trade policies, treaties, tariffs and taxes. The U.S. government has and continues to make significant additional changes in U.S. trade policy and has taken certain actions that could negatively impact U.S. trade. In addition, there may be further changes in U.S. trade policy given the change in the presidential administration. For example, in 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") enacted various tariffs of 7.5%, 10%, 15% and 25% on imports into the U.S. from China, including communications equipment products and components manufactured and imported from China. USTR has continued to expand these tariffs recently announcing new tariffs of up to 100% on certain products. Since then, China has retaliated through various trade related measures including imposing tariffs on imports into China from the United States. Most recently, in February 2025, the U.S. government imposed an additional 10% tariff on imports from China, on top of existing tariff burdens, and the U.S. President has indicated that additional tariffs may be forthcoming. In response, China announced additional tariffs on certain U.S.-origin goods and implemented new export controls on various critical metals. Additional changes or threatened changes in U.S. trade measures have affected and may continue to affect trade involving additional countries as well, including Mexico, Canada, Colombia, the United Kingdom, and the member countries of the European Union among others. Each of these measures or threatened measures may instigate reciprocal countermeasures by affected countries, potentially accelerating further increases in trade measures. Such escalations in these trade measures may directly impair our business by increasing trade-related costs or disrupting established supply chains and may indirectly impair our business by causing a negative effect on global economic conditions and financial markets. The ultimate impact of these trade measures is uncertain, and may be affected by various factors, including whether and when such trade measures are implemented, the timing when such measures may become effective, and the amount, scope, or nature of such trade measures. The U.S. government continues to add additional entities, in China and elsewhere, to restricted party lists impacting the ability of U.S. companies to provide products, and in certain cases services, to these entities and, in some cases, receive products or services from these entities. Additionally, the U.S. government continues to expand controls enacted in October 2022 restricting the ability to send certain products and technology related to semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing, and supercomputing to China without an export license. In 2023 and 2024, the U.S. government expanded the list of advanced integrated circuits subject to heightened export controls, including certain hardware containing these specified integrated circuits, expanded the list of destinations requiring export authorization for such items, and added new restrictions based on the headquarters location of the parties involved. Proposed regulations would further expand the controls to impose a worldwide licensing requirement on certain integrated circuits and computing resources that are used for training of AI models. The U.S. government also continues to expand the scope of restrictions on the development or production of advanced integrated circuits and certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and the restrictions on supercomputing, in China and other countries. Proposed regulations would expand these controls further and impose additional reporting requirements. Other foreign governments may in turn impose similar or more restrictive controls. These controls or any additional restrictions may impact our ability to export certain products to China or other countries, prohibit us from selling our products to certain of our customers, restrict our ability to use certain Integrated Circuits (“ICs”) in our products, or impact our suppliers who may utilize facilities or equipment described in these controls. It also is possible that the Chinese government will retaliate in ways that could impact our business. For example, China has announced controls on both the use of Micron products and export license requirements on certain materials used, among other things, in the production of semiconductors, optical components, and other electronic devices including germanium and gallium. China also has announced a new export control regime. Additionally, these restrictions could disrupt the ability of China to produce semiconductors and other electronics and impact our ability to source components from China. China has also announced plans to implement retaliatory countermeasures in response to the additional 10% tariffs imposed by the United States in February 2025, including new tariffs on certain U.S. origin goods, and has implemented export controls on various critical metal materials. These restrictions could impact the cost of components or inputs used to produce our products. 41 41 41 Should the relationship between China and Taiwan deteriorate, it is possible that the U.S. government could impose new controls on China, specific parties, or specific kinds of transactions in the region that could impact our business including our ability to source components from China and sell to certain of our customers. These restrictions could impact the cost of components or inputs used to produce our products. Additionally, these controls or any additional restrictions may impact our ability to export certain products to China and/or prohibit us from selling our products to certain of our customers. We cannot predict what actions may ultimately be taken with respect to trade relations between the United States and China or other countries, what products may be subject to such actions or what actions may be taken by the other countries in retaliation. If we are unable to obtain or use components for inclusion in our products, if component prices increase significantly or if we are unable to export or sell our products to any of our customers, our business, liquidity, financial condition, and/or results of operations would be materially and adversely affected. As well, due to concerns with products and services from certain semiconductor, telecommunications and video providers based in China, U.S. Congress has enacted bans on the use of certain Chinese-origin components or systems either in items sold to the U.S. government or, in some cases, in the internal networks of government contractors and subcontractors (even if those networks are not used for government-related projects). Further, the Chinese government has responded to these U.S. actions by indicating its intention to develop an unreliable entity list, which may limit the ability of companies on the list to engage in business with Chinese customers. If tariffs, trade restrictions, or trade barriers remain in place or if new tariffs, trade restrictions, or trade barriers are placed on products such as ours by U.S. or foreign governments, especially China, our costs may increase. We believe we can adjust our supply chain and manufacturing practices to minimize the impact of the tariffs and any impact on the supply chain of components sourced in China, but our efforts may not be successful, there can be no assurance that we will not experience a disruption in our business related to these or other changes in trade practices and the process of changing suppliers in order to mitigate any such tariff costs could be complicated, time-consuming, and costly. The U.S. tariffs may also cause customers to delay orders as they evaluate where to take delivery of our products in connection with their efforts to mitigate their own tariff exposure. Such delays create forecasting difficulties for us and increase the risk that orders might be canceled or might never be placed. Current or future tariffs imposed by the U.S. may also negatively impact our customers' sales, thereby causing an indirect negative impact on our own sales. Even in the absence of further tariffs, the related uncertainty and the market's fear of an escalating trade war might cause our distributors and customers to place fewer orders for our products, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, liquidity, financial condition, and/or results of operations. In June 2022, the import restrictions contained in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act ("UFLPA") became effective. The UFLPA creates a rebuttable presumption that any goods mined, produced or manufactured, wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“XUAR”) of China, or produced by a listed entity, were made with forced labor and would therefore not be entitled to entry at any U.S. port. Importers are required to present clear and convincing evidence that such goods are not made with forced labor. While we do not source items from the XUAR or from listed parties, and we have increased our supply chain diligence, there is risk that our ability to import components and products may be adversely affected by the UFLPA. Given the relatively fluid regulatory environment in China and the United States and uncertainty how the U.S. government or foreign governments will act with respect to tariffs, international trade agreements and policies, a trade war, further governmental action related to tariffs or international trade policies, or additional tax or other regulatory changes in the future could directly and adversely impact our financial results and results of operations. In addition to laws aimed directly at trade, failure of our products to comply with a broader set of evolving industry standards and government regulations may adversely impact our business and in particular our ability to market in particular countries. Our products must comply with various U.S. federal government regulations and standards defined by agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, standards established by governmental authorities in various foreign countries and recommendations of the International Telecommunication Union. In some circumstances, we must obtain regulatory approvals or certificates of compliance before we can offer or distribute our products in certain jurisdictions or to certain customers. In recent years, certain jurisdictions have tied these approvals to concerns about international relationships, including, e.g., concerns about entities with components sourced from China. Complying with new regulations or obtaining certifications, especially as standards evolve, may be costly and disruptive to our business and also may affect our ability to sell 42 42 42 our products where these standards or regulations apply, which in turn may prevent us from sustaining our net revenues or achieving profitability.
View prior text (2024)
There is currently significant uncertainty about the future relationship between the United States, and various other countries, most significantly China, with respect to trade policies, treaties, tariffs and taxes. The U.S. government has and continues to make significant additional changes in U.S. trade policy and has taken certain actions that could negatively impact U.S. trade. For example, in 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative enacted various tariffs of 7.5%, 10%, 15% and 25% on imports into the U.S. from China, including communications equipment products and components manufactured and imported from China. Since then, China has retaliated through various trade related measures including imposing tariffs on imports into China from the United States. The U.S. government continues to add additional entities, in China and elsewhere, to restricted party lists impacting the ability of U.S. companies to provide products, and in certain cases services, to these entities and, in some cases, receive products or services from these entities. Additionally, the U.S. government continues to expand controls enacted in October 2022 restricting the ability to send certain products and technology related to semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing, and supercomputing to China without an export license. In 2023, the U.S. government expanded the list of advanced integrated circuits subject to heightened export controls, including certain hardware containing these specified integrated circuits, expanded the list of destinations requiring export authorization for such items, and added new restrictions based on the headquarters location of the parties involved. The U.S. government also has expanded the scope of restrictions on the development or production of advanced integrated circuits and certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and the restrictions on supercomputing, in China and other countries. Other foreign governments may in turn impose similar or more restrictive controls. These controls or any additional restrictions may impact our ability to export certain products to China or other countries, prohibit us from selling our products to certain of our customers, restrict our ability to use certain Integrated Circuits (“ICs”) in our products, or impact our suppliers who may utilize facilities or equipment described in these controls. It also is possible that the Chinese government will retaliate in ways that could impact our business. For example, China has announced controls on both the use of Micron products and export license requirements on certain materials used, 39 39 39 among other things, in the production of semiconductors, optical components, and other electronic devices including germanium and gallium. Additionally, these restrictions could disrupt the ability of China to produce semiconductors and other electronics and impact our ability to source components from China. These restrictions could impact the cost of components or inputs used to produce our products. Should the relationship between China and Taiwan deteriorate, it is possible that the U.S. government could impose new controls on China, specific parties, or specific kinds of transactions in the region that could impact our business including our ability to source components from China and sell to certain of our customers. These restrictions could impact the cost of components or inputs used to produce our products. Additionally, these controls or any additional restrictions may impact our ability to export certain products to China and/or prohibit us from selling our products to certain of our customers. We cannot predict what actions may ultimately be taken with respect to trade relations between the United States and China or other countries, what products may be subject to such actions or what actions may be taken by the other countries in retaliation. If we are unable to obtain or use components for inclusion in our products, if component prices increase significantly or if we are unable to export or sell our products to any of our customers, our business, liquidity, financial condition, and/or results of operations would be materially and adversely affected. As well, due to concerns with products and services from certain semiconductor, telecommunications and video providers based in China, U.S. Congress has enacted bans on the use of certain Chinese-origin components or systems either in items sold to the U.S. government or, in some cases, in the internal networks of government contractors and subcontractors (even if those networks are not used for government-related projects). Further, the Chinese government has responded to these U.S. actions by indicating its intention to develop an unreliable entity list, which may limit the ability of companies on the list to engage in business with Chinese customers. If tariffs, trade restrictions, or trade barriers remain in place or if new tariffs, trade restrictions, or trade barriers are placed on products such as ours by U.S. or foreign governments, especially China, our costs may increase. We believe we can adjust our supply chain and manufacturing practices to minimize the impact of the tariffs and any impact on the supply chain of components sourced in China, but our efforts may not be successful, there can be no assurance that we will not experience a disruption in our business related to these or other changes in trade practices and the process of changing suppliers in order to mitigate any such tariff costs could be complicated, time-consuming, and costly. The U.S. tariffs may also cause customers to delay orders as they evaluate where to take delivery of our products in connection with their efforts to mitigate their own tariff exposure. Such delays create forecasting difficulties for us and increase the risk that orders might be canceled or might never be placed. Current or future tariffs imposed by the U.S. may also negatively impact our customers' sales, thereby causing an indirect negative impact on our own sales. Even in the absence of further tariffs, the related uncertainty and the market's fear of an escalating trade war might cause our distributors and customers to place fewer orders for our products, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, liquidity, financial condition, and/or results of operations. In June 2022, the import restrictions contained in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act ("UFLPA") became effective. The UFLPA creates a rebuttable presumption that any goods mined, produced or manufactured, wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“XUAR”) of China, or produced by a listed entity, were made with forced labor and would therefore not be entitled to entry at any U.S. port. Importers are required to present clear and convincing evidence that such goods are not made with forced labor. While we do not source items from the XUAR or from listed parties, and we have increased our supply chain diligence, there is risk that our ability to import components and products may be adversely affected by the UFLPA. Given the relatively fluid regulatory environment in China and the United States and uncertainty how the U.S. government or foreign governments will act with respect to tariffs, international trade agreements and policies, a trade war, further governmental action related to tariffs or international trade policies, or additional tax or other regulatory changes in the future could directly and adversely impact our financial results and results of operations. In addition to laws aimed directly at trade, failure of our products to comply with a broader set of evolving industry standards and government regulations may adversely impact our business and in particular our ability to market in particular countries. Our products must comply with various U.S. federal government regulations and standards defined by agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, standards established by governmental authorities in various foreign countries and recommendations of the International Telecommunication Union. In some circumstances, we must obtain regulatory 40 40 40 approvals or certificates of compliance before we can offer or distribute our products in certain jurisdictions or to certain customers. In recent years, certain jurisdictions have tied these approvals to concerns about international relationships, including, e.g., concerns about entities with components sourced from China. Complying with new regulations or obtaining certifications, especially as standards evolve, may be costly and disruptive to our business and also may affect our ability to sell our products where these standards or regulations apply, which in turn may prevent us from sustaining our net revenues or achieving profitability.