Intercontinental Exchange Inc.: 10-K Risk Factor Changes

There are risks inherent in operating clearing houses, including exposure to the market and counterparty risk of clearing members, market liquidity risks, defaults by clearing members and risks associated with custody and investing margin or guaranty fund assets provided by clearing members to our clearing houses, which could subject our business to substantial losses. As of December 31, 2025, we custody a total of $81.2 billion of clearing members' margin and guaranty funds across all of our clearing houses. To the extent available, ICE clearing houses use Sovereign Central Banks to custody assets. For example, ICE Clear Credit holds the U.S. dollar cash and U.S. Treasuries that clearing members transfer to satisfy their original margin and guaranty fund requirements at its account at the Federal Reserve. ICE clearing houses may also use third-party investment agents for investment of cash assets, subject to the guidelines provided by each clearing house, and may add or change the investment agents from time to time. Although our clearing houses have policies and procedures to manage the risks to which they are exposed, including collecting margin and guaranty fund contributions from clearing members, such policies and procedures may not succeed in preventing losses after a member's or counterparty’s default. The processes for calculating and setting margins and financial safeguards are complex and there is no guarantee that our risk models that are utilized to calculate margin and our financial safeguard procedures will adequately protect us in all circumstances. In addition, from time to time, we may redesign the methodology of the risk models that are utilized to calculate margin. Redesigning and implementing a new risk model is a complex process, involving quantitative analysis, regulatory approval and implementation risk. We cannot guarantee that the measures and safeguards we have undertaken to design, implement and operate risk models, calculate and collect margin, and protect our clearing houses in the case of a clearing member default, will be sufficient. Accordingly, it is possible that we would be materially and adversely affected in the event of one or more significant defaults. We have contributed our own capital, or ‘Skin in the Game’, to the front of the guaranty fund of each of the 24 24 24 clearing houses that could be used in the event of a default. We also have default insurance that resides after and in addition to the ICE Clear Credit (for CDS clearing), ICE Clear Europe, and ICE Clear U.S. ‘Skin in the Game’ contributions to the default waterfalls of each of the clearing houses and before the guaranty fund contributions of the non-defaulting clearing members. Notwithstanding these actions, the default of one or more of the clearing members could subject our business to substantial losses and/or cause our customers to lose confidence in our clearing houses and, as a result, in our exchange traded business in general. We announced on February 3, 2026, that the SEC approved ICE Clear Credit’s application to expand its current registered Covered Clearing Agency designation to add U.S. Treasury clearing. Although the new Treasury clearing service is operationally live for the clearing of cash transactions and expects to go live for repurchase transactions in the fourth quarter of 2026, there is no assurance that the service will achieve meaningful market adoption and competition within the U.S. Treasury clearing market may limit the commercial success of this offering. While ICE Clear Credit has established the U.S. Treasury clearing business as a distinct and segregated business line from its existing CDS clearing business, with its own rulebook, membership, risk management framework, financial and liquidity resources, and governance structure, operating both business lines out of the same legal entity poses risks that any financial, operational, or risk management failure within the U.S. Treasury clearing business could adversely affect the CDS clearing business. We cannot guarantee that the policies, controls, and safeguards implemented to design, launch, and operate this new service will be sufficient to mitigate these risks.

There are risks inherent in operating clearing houses, including exposure to the market and counterparty risk of clearing members, market liquidity risks, defaults by clearing members and risks associated with custody and investing margin or guaranty fund assets provided by clearing members to our clearing houses, which could subject our business to substantial losses. As of December 31, 2024, we custody a total of $84.3 billion of clearing members' margin and guaranty funds across all of our clearing houses. To the extent available, ICE clearing houses use Sovereign Central Banks to 23 23 23 custody assets. For example, ICE Clear Credit holds the U.S. dollar cash and U.S. Treasuries that clearing members transfer to satisfy their original margin and guaranty fund requirements at its account at the Federal Reserve. ICE clearing houses may also use third-party investment agents for investment of cash assets, subject to the guidelines provided by each clearing house, and may add or change the investment agents from time to time. Although our clearing houses have policies and procedures to manage the risks to which they are exposed, including collecting margin and guaranty fund contributions from clearing members, such policies and procedures may not succeed in preventing losses after a member's or counterparty’s default. The processes for calculating and setting margins and financial safeguards is complex and there is no guarantee that our risk models that are utilized to calculate margin and our financial safeguard procedures will adequately protect us in all circumstances. In addition, from time to time, we may redesign the methodology of the risk models that are utilized to calculate margin. Redesigning and implementing a new risk model is a complex process, involving quantitative analysis, regulatory approval and implementation risk. We cannot guarantee that the measures and safeguards we have undertaken to design, implement and operate risk models, calculate and collect margin, and protect our clearing houses in the case of a clearing member default, will be sufficient. Accordingly, it is possible that we would be materially and adversely affected in the event of one or more significant defaults. We have contributed our own capital, or ‘Skin in the Game’, to the front of the guaranty fund of each of the clearing houses that could be used in the event of a default. We also have default insurance that resides after and in addition to the ICE Clear Credit, ICE Clear Europe, and ICE Clear U.S. ‘Skin in the Game’ contributions to the default waterfalls of each of the clearing houses and before the guaranty fund contributions of the non-defaulting clearing members. Notwithstanding these actions, the default of one or more of the clearing members could subject our business to substantial losses and/or cause our customers to lose confidence in our clearing houses and, as a result, in our exchange traded business in general.

Certain of our subsidiaries administer, produce and license a variety of benchmarks and indices across multiple asset classes, which are used globally and are referenced in certain of our trading and clearing products. To ensure continued trading and clearing in these benchmark-related products, and the continued licensing and use of these benchmarks and indices, our subsidiaries must be able to demonstrate that these benchmarks and indices are determined with integrity and are not readily subject to manipulation. Our subsidiaries must also continue to evolve these benchmarks and indices as necessary to maintain their reliability and relevance, and continue to administer, produce and license these benchmarks and indices in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Any failures, negative publicity or lawsuits related to our subsidiaries' administration of benchmarks and indices could result in a loss of confidence in the administration of these benchmarks and indices and could harm our business and our reputation. Our subsidiary, IBA, administers various globally important benchmarks, including ICE Swap Rate. As a “critical” benchmark, the administration of ICE Swap Rate is subject to additional obligations under the U.K. BMR. These include the ability of the FCA to compel continued administration of ICE Swap Rate for up to 10 years if the administrator intends to cease providing the benchmark, to impose changes in the way the benchmark is determined if the FCA believes the benchmark is unrepresentative or its representativeness is at risk and to apply prohibitions and restrictions on the use of 32 32 32 the benchmark in certain circumstances. Changes to, cessations of, and the replacement of or transition from, our subsidiaries' benchmarks and indices or any other changes or reforms to the determination or administration of such benchmarks and indices, could result in legal risks or risks to our reputation, and could have an adverse impact on our business, financial condition and operating results. Any failures, negative publicity or lawsuits related to our subsidiaries’ administration of benchmarks could result in a loss of confidence in our subsidiaries’ administration of benchmarks and indices and could harm our business and our reputation. Following Brexit, supervised entities in the EU have been able to continue to use benchmarks administered by our subsidiaries outside of the EU under certain transitional provisions of the EU BMR. These transitional provisions expired on December 31, 2025. On January 1, 2026, the EU BMR was amended to reduce its scope to cover only certain benchmarks. Our subsidiaries outside of the EU that administer benchmarks which continue to be in scope of the regulation have sought recognition in order for EU-supervised entities to continue to be able to use these benchmarks. To the extent such subsidiaries are unable to obtain recognition for any reason or EU-supervised entities are otherwise unable to continue to license and use their in scope benchmarks, our business and our reputation could be harmed. In addition, certain authorities, including those in the U.K. and the EU, have issued consultations to gather feedback on index provider businesses or are undertaking reviews of current regulations. The results of these consultations or reviews may lead to a regulatory response that could affect our business. Additional regulation on index providers in the U.S., U.K., EU or other jurisdictions, could have a negative impact on our revenues.

Certain of our subsidiaries administer, produce and license a variety of benchmarks and indices across multiple asset classes, which are used globally and are referenced in certain of our trading and clearing products. To ensure continued trading and clearing in these benchmark-related products, and the continued licensing and use of these benchmarks and indices, our subsidiaries must be able to demonstrate that these benchmarks and indices are determined with integrity and are not readily subject to manipulation. Our subsidiaries must also continue to evolve these benchmarks and indices as necessary to maintain their reliability and relevance, and continue to administer, produce and license these benchmarks and indices in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Any failures, negative publicity or lawsuits related to our subsidiaries' administration of benchmarks and indices could result in a loss of confidence in the administration of these benchmarks and indices and could harm our business and our reputation. Changes to, cessations of, and the replacement of or transition from, our subsidiaries' benchmarks and indices or any other changes or reforms to the determination or administration of such benchmarks and indices, could result in legal risks 31 31 31 or risks to our reputation, and could have an adverse impact on our business, financial condition and operating results. Our subsidiary, IBA, administers various globally important benchmarks, including ICE Swap Rate. IBA was the administrator of LIBOR until the cessation of the benchmark at the end of September 2024. As a “critical” benchmark, LIBOR was subject to a wind-down prior to its ultimate cessation, which included a period during which IBA was compelled by the FCA to continue to publish certain LIBOR settings under a changed "synthetic" methodology. Any LIBOR settings published under a “synthetic” methodology were not representative of the underlying market or economic reality such settings were intended to measure prior to the period of compulsion. On November 13, 2024, ICE Swap Rate was designated as a “critical” benchmark, and, as a result, administration of the benchmark is subject to additional obligations under the UK Benchmark Regulation. These include the ability of the FCA to compel continued administration of ICE Swap Rate for up to 10 years if the administrator intends to cease providing the benchmark, to impose changes in the way the benchmark is determined if the FCA believes the benchmark is unrepresentative or its representativeness is at risk and to apply prohibitions and restrictions on the use of the benchmark in certain circumstances. Any failures, negative publicity or lawsuits related to IBA’s administration of LIBOR, including during the period of “synthetic” LIBOR, or ICE Swap Rate, could result in a loss of confidence in our subsidiaries’ administration of benchmarks and indices and could harm our business and our reputation. Benchmarks administered by our subsidiaries outside of the EU may continue to be used by supervised entities in the EU under transitional provisions of the EU Benchmarks Regulation until December 31, 2025, after which time those subsidiaries, as administrators of "third-country" benchmarks, will need to utilize one of the mechanisms provided under that regulation in order for EU-supervised entities to continue to use their third-country benchmarks. To the extent our subsidiaries are unable to utilize one of those mechanisms for any reason once transitional provisions end, there is a risk that EU-supervised entities will not be able to continue to license and use their benchmarks, which could harm our business and our reputation. In addition, certain authorities, including those in the U.S., the U.K. and the EU, have issued consultations to gather feedback on index provider businesses or are undertaking reviews of current regulations. The results of these consultations or reviews may lead to a regulatory response that could affect our business. Additional regulation on index providers in the U.S., U.K., EU or other jurisdictions, could have a negative impact on our revenues.

The determination of the value of goodwill and other intangible assets requires the use of estimates and assumptions that affect our consolidated financial statements. As of December 31, 2025, we had goodwill of $30.6 billion and net other intangible assets of $15.4 billion relating to our acquisitions, including our acquisition of Black Knight in September 2023. As of December 31, 2025, we had a total carrying value of $1.6 billion relating to our equity investments, including our investment in Blockratize, Inc., doing business as Polymarket. 27 27 27 During 2024 and 2023, we recorded impairments on certain developed technology and trademark finite-lived intangible assets, respectively. We cannot assure you that we will not experience future events that may result in these types of impairments. An impairment of the value of our existing goodwill, other intangible assets and other investments and assets could have a significant negative impact on our future operating results. For additional information on our goodwill, other intangible assets and investments, refer to Notes 3, 4 and 9 to our consolidated financial statements and “- Critical Accounting Estimates - Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets Impairment Assessment” in Item 7 “- Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,” which are included in this Annual Report.

The determination of the value of goodwill and other intangible assets requires the use of estimates and assumptions that affect our consolidated financial statements. As of December 31, 2024, we had goodwill of $30.6 billion and net other intangible assets of $16.3 billion relating to our acquisitions, including our acquisition of Black Knight in September 2023, and our purchase of trademarks and Internet domain names from various third parties. 26 26 26 During 2024 and 2023, we recorded an impairment on certain developed technology trademark definite-lived intangible assets, respectively, and during 2022, we recorded an impairment of our equity investment in Bakkt. We cannot assure you that we will not experience future events that may result in these types of impairments. An impairment of the value of our existing goodwill, other intangible assets and other investments and assets could have a significant negative impact on our future operating results. For additional information on our goodwill, other intangible assets and investments, refer to Notes 3, 4 and 9 to our consolidated financial statements and “- Critical Accounting Policies - Goodwill and Other Identifiable Intangible Assets” in Item 7 “- Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,” which are included in this Annual Report.

The cybersecurity threat landscape remains a macro concern for most organizations, and particularly those associated with the U.S. financial infrastructure. We may be more likely than other companies to be a target of cyberattacks and other cybersecurity risks due to our role in the global financial ecosystem and the high-profile nature of many of our businesses that deliver critical services to a broad range of financial market participants. In addition, in recent years, cyberattacks have become more frequent and increasingly sophisticated as malicious actors seek to deploy artificial intelligence, quantum computing or other emerging technologies in their efforts. For a discussion of our cyber risks, see "—Item 1- "Business—Cybersecurity". Our systems and those of our third-party service providers are vulnerable to cyberattacks, hacking and other cybersecurity risks, which could result in wrongful manipulation, disclosure, destruction, or use of our information or that of a third party, or which could make our customers unable or reluctant to use our electronic platforms or other products and services. It is impossible to precisely predict the likelihood or impact of any cyberattack on the securities industry generally, or on our business. In the event of a cyberattack or a threat of a cyberattack, our procedures may not be effective in immediately detecting and responding to such threats and, upon doing so, our security measures and contingency plans may be inadequate to prevent significant disruptions in our business, technology or access to the infrastructure necessary 23 23 23 to maintain our business. In addition, our insurance may be insufficient to cover in full the liabilities or losses that we may incur in the event of a successful cyberattack. Any of these events could adversely affect our business, financial condition and operating results.

The cybersecurity threat landscape remains a macro concern for most organizations, and particularly those associated with the U.S. financial infrastructure. We may be more likely than other companies to be a target of cyberattacks and other cybersecurity risks due to our role in the global financial ecosystem and the high-profile nature of many of our businesses that deliver critical services to a broad range of financial market participants. For a discussion of our cyber risks, see “—Item 1- "Business—Cybersecurity". Our systems and those of our third-party service providers are vulnerable to cyberattacks, hacking and other cybersecurity risks, which could result in wrongful manipulation, disclosure, destruction, or use of our information or that of a third party, or which could make our customers unable or reluctant to use our electronic platforms or other products and services.” It is impossible to precisely predict the likelihood or impact of any cyberattack on the securities industry generally, or on our business. In the event of a cyberattack or a threat of a cyberattack, our security measures and contingency plans may be inadequate to prevent significant disruptions in our business, technology or access to the infrastructure necessary to maintain our business. Any of these events could adversely affect our business, financial condition and operating results.

The long-term effects of Brexit will depend, in part, on the agreement the U.K. made to retain access to EU markets, and whether the EU and U.K. continue to implement regulatory proposals related to the provision of financial services and the administration of benchmarks and indices in the EU and U.K. Following Brexit, matters of access in financial services are left to be addressed through declarations of equivalence under existing equivalence regimes contained in U.K. and EU law and through domestic laws. In January 2025, the European Commission adopted a new equivalence decision that allows continued access by EU firms to clear trades at U.K. central counterparties until June 30, 2028. Subsequently, in March 2025, ESMA extended the tiering determination and temporary recognition decisions for ICE Clear Europe until June 30, 2028, which allows continued access for EU firms to clear trades at ICE Clear Europe. In the absence of an extension of the temporary equivalence or permanent equivalence of U.K. CCPs by the European Commission, EU persons would be restricted in accessing clearing services at ICE Clear Europe, which could impact clearing revenues, and could also cause us to change our business practices, restructure our businesses or move certain of our businesses and employees. In June 2023, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, or FSMA 2023, was enacted, which makes significant changes to U.K. financial services regulation and incorporates considerations of the HM Treasury's March 2022 Wholesale Markets Review. The FSMA 2023 expands the U.K.’s existing resolution regime for CCPs and enables the BOE to take full control of a CCP when necessary without relying on its existing powers, and permits the BOE to use a number of tools without reliance on the CCPs' rulebook. In addition, in July 2025, the BOE published a consultation on the U.K.'s regulatory framework for CCPs. The proposals for U.K. CCPs, if finalized, would increase the costs of operating a CCP in the U.K., raise regulatory burdens on U.K. CCPs and could consequently have a negative effect on revenue earned by U.K. CCPs and ICEU and place U.K. CCPs at a competitive disadvantage. As a result of the U.K. and EU trade and cooperation agreement not providing free trade arrangements for financial services, any equivalence determinations or any further transition period for financial services could include restrictions on access to our services by persons located in the EU or make access more expensive, which could adversely affect our operations and profitability or even make it uneconomical for us to continue to conduct all or certain of our businesses in such jurisdictions. The consequences of Brexit and the terms of the trade and cooperation agreement could also cause us to incur significant costs associated with changing our business practices, restructuring our businesses or moving certain of our businesses and our employees to other jurisdictions. See Item 1 “- Business - Regulation” above for additional information regarding Brexit, including risks to our business associated with Brexit.

The long-term effects of Brexit will depend, in part, on the agreement the U.K. made to retain access to EU markets, and whether the EU and U.K. continue to implement regulatory proposals related to the provision of financial services and the administration of benchmarks and indices in the EU and U.K. Following Brexit, matters of access in financial services are left to be addressed through declarations of equivalence under existing equivalence regimes contained in U.K. and EU law and through domestic laws. In February 2022, the European Commission extended its temporary equivalence decision for U.K. CCPs until June 30, 2025. ICE Clear Europe has been recognized by ESMA as a third-country CCP in accordance with EMIR and in March 2022, ESMA extended ICE Clear Europe's temporary recognition and tiering decision to June 2025. In January 2025, the European Union proposed to extend the equivalence decision for UK CCPs until June 30, 2028. In the absence of an extension of the temporary equivalence or permanent equivalence of U.K. CCPs by the European Commission, EU persons would be restricted in accessing clearing services at ICE Clear Europe, which could impact clearing revenues, and could also cause us to change our business practices, restructure our businesses or move certain of our businesses and employees. In June 2023, the FSMA 2023 was enacted, which makes significant changes to U.K. financial services regulation and incorporates considerations of the HM Treasury's March 2022 Wholesale Markets Review. The FSMA 2023 expands the U.K.’s existing resolution regime for CCPs and enables the BOE to take full control of a CCP when necessary without relying on its existing powers, and permits the BOE to use a number of tools without reliance on the CCP’s rulebook. As a result of the U.K. and EU trade and cooperation agreement not providing free trade arrangements for financial services, any equivalence determinations or any further transition period for financial services could include restrictions on access to our services by persons located in the EU or make access more expensive, which could adversely affect our operations and profitability or even make it uneconomical for us to continue to conduct all or certain of our businesses in such jurisdictions. The consequences of Brexit and the terms of the trade and cooperation agreement could also cause us to incur significant costs associated with changing our business practices, restructuring our businesses or moving certain of our businesses and our employees to other jurisdictions. See Item 1 “- Business - Regulation” above for additional information regarding Brexit, including risks to our business associated with Brexit.

Climate-related risks and increases in the frequency or severity of extreme weather events and other natural disasters, and such events could negatively impact our activities and results of operations and impact the activities of our customers or third-party vendors or suppliers. The physical commodities and assets underlying certain of our markets may also be impacted by climate-related risks and extreme weather events, which could impact users of our markets. The risks associated with extreme weather events and other natural disasters may evolve rapidly and we expect that climate-related risks may increase over time.

Climate change may increase the frequency or severity of extreme weather events and other natural disasters, and such events could negatively impact our activities and results of operations and impact the activities of our customers or third-party vendors or suppliers. The physical commodities and assets underlying certain of our markets may also be impacted by climate change, which could impact users of our markets. The risks associated with climate change may evolve rapidly and we expect that climate change-related risks may increase over time.