{
  "ticker": "V",
  "company": "Visa Inc.",
  "filing_type": "10-K",
  "year_current": "2026",
  "year_prior": "2025",
  "summary": {
    "added": 0,
    "removed": 0,
    "modified": 21,
    "unchanged": 0,
    "total_current": 21,
    "total_prior": 21
  },
  "source": "SEC EDGAR",
  "url": "https://riskdiff.com/v/2026-vs-2025/",
  "markdown_url": "https://riskdiff.com/v/2026-vs-2025/index.md",
  "json_url": "https://riskdiff.com/v/2026-vs-2025/index.json",
  "access": "public_preview",
  "source_filings": [
    {
      "label": "2026 10-K filing on SEC EDGAR",
      "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403161/000140316126000134/0001403161-26-000134-index.htm"
    },
    {
      "label": "2025 10-K filing on SEC EDGAR",
      "url": "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403161/000140316125000089/0001403161-25-000089-index.htm"
    }
  ],
  "generated": "2026-11-05",
  "ai_summary": "Risk disclosures were substantially reworded, broadening examples across technology, cyber incidents, regulation and international trade without establishing a change in underlying risk.",
  "ai_brief": {
    "executive_summary": "Risk disclosures were substantially reworded, broadening examples across technology, cyber incidents, regulation and international trade without establishing a change in underlying risk.",
    "direction": "neutral",
    "top_themes": [
      "Artificial Intelligence",
      "Cybersecurity",
      "Regulatory & Legal"
    ]
  },
  "risks": [
    {
      "status": "MODIFIED",
      "current_title": "Increased scrutiny and regulation of fees, operating rules and related practices of the global payments industry, could harm our business.",
      "prior_title": "Increased scrutiny and regulation of the global payments industry, including with respect to interchange reimbursement fees, merchant discount rates, operating rules, risk management protocols and other related practices, could harm our business.",
      "severity": {
        "deterministic": 7,
        "ai_bump": 0,
        "total": 7,
        "tier": "medium",
        "signal_hits": [
          "regulation",
          "rates"
        ]
      },
      "similarity_score": 0.528,
      "confidence": "low",
      "key_changes": [
        "Reworded sentence: \"Regulators worldwide are expanding their authority over the payments industry, including IRFs, MDRs, network fees, operating rules, and related practices.\""
      ],
      "current_body": "Regulators worldwide are expanding their authority over the payments industry, including IRFs, MDRs, network fees, operating rules, and related practices. See Item 1—Government Regulation of this report for more information. Although we generally do not receive IRF revenue directly, IRFs are a key competitive factor that affects our overall payments volume and net revenue. Countries globally have adopted or are exploring interchange caps or MDR regulations. For example: •U.S. Federal Reserve regulations cap U.S. debit IRFs for large issuers, and the Dodd-Frank Act restricts network exclusivity and preferred routing for debit and prepaid products. The Federal Reserve has recently taken actions to revisit its regulations that implement these aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act, including requiring issuers to ensure dual-network availability for ecommerce debit transactions and proposing further rate reductions with automatic biennial adjustments. Recent conflicting federal court decisions on the validity of Regulation II's interchange fee standard have created additional uncertainty and could result in a significantly lower interchange cap for debit transactions. Separately, Congress has reintroduced the Credit Card Competition Act (CCCA), legislation requiring, among other things, large issuers to offer routing choices for credit transactions. It remains unclear if the CCCA will gain sufficient traction to advance in the current Congress. States such as Illinois have enacted or are considering laws restricting how interchange is set and assessed and how payment transaction data may be used, potentially imposing significant compliance and operational costs, requiring significant changes to our systems and processes, and even potentially limiting the products and services we are able to offer in those states. •EU’s Interchange Fee Regulation caps consumer credit and debit IRFs for transactions within the EEA. Member states may impose further reductions, and the European Commission (EC) may periodically reassess Interchange Fee Regulations, which could further lower caps or expand regulation to additional products, services and fees. •Regulatory interest in cross-border interchange rates continues to grow and governments are using regulation to drive down MDR, which could negatively affect transaction economics. Our EC settlement in 2019, which was extended through 2029, limits certain cross-border IRFs within the EEA. Additional jurisdictions have adopted or proposed cross-border interchange caps or cross-border MDR regulations. Certain regulators are reviewing or have passed requirements relating to network scheme and processing fees, including with respect to governance, reporting and transparency that could impose additional compliance burdens and competitive complexities where the requirements are not imposed evenly across all payment networks. For example, in 2024, the Greek Parliament limited acquirer fees for certain small ticket transactions in some seller categories for a period of three years. Separately, industry participants in multiple jurisdictions have sought regulatory or judicial intervention regarding our network rules, including restrictions on cross-border acquiring. Certain countries have enacted regulations permitting cross-border acquiring for ecommerce. Other countries require government pre-approval of network rule changes more broadly. Government regulation may also require us to permit competing networks to support our products, share intellectual property, meet onshore capital requirements, or accommodate other networks' branding on Visa-issued products. In addition, regulatory developments in one jurisdiction or product category may be replicated elsewhere or extended to other products. Reduced IRFs may make our network less attractive to issuers and acquirers and may make other payment systems including closed-loop payment systems that connect directly with sellers and consumers more competitive. Issuers may respond by raising fees or reducing benefits to consumers, and acquirers may charge higher MDRs regardless of our IRFs, steering sellers and consumers toward alternative payment methods, all of which could harm our business and financial results.",
      "prior_body": "Regulators around the world have been establishing or increasing their authority to regulate various aspects of the payments industry. See Item 1—Government Regulation for more information. In the U.S. and many other jurisdictions, we have historically set default IRFs. Even though we generally do not receive any revenue related to IRFs in a payment transaction (in the context of credit and debit transactions, those fees are paid by the acquirers to the issuers; the reverse is true for certain transactions like ATM transactions), IRFs are a factor on which we compete with other payments providers and are therefore an important determinant of the volume of transactions we process. Consequently, changes to these fees, whether voluntarily or by mandate, can substantially affect our overall payments volume and net revenue. Interchange reimbursement fees, certain operating rules and related practices continue to be subject to increased government regulation globally, and regulatory authorities and central banks in a number of jurisdictions have reviewed or are reviewing these fees, rules and practices. For example: •Regulations adopted by the U.S. Federal Reserve cap the maximum U.S. debit interchange reimbursement rate received by large financial institutions at 21 cents plus 5 basis points per transaction, plus a possible fraud adjustment of 1 cent. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act limits issuers’ and payment networks’ ability to adopt network exclusivity and preferred routing in the debit and prepaid area, which also impacts our business. In response to seller requests, the Federal Reserve has recently taken actions to revisit its regulations that implement these aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, in October 2022, the Federal Reserve published a final rule effectively requiring issuers to ensure that at least two unaffiliated networks are available for routing ecommerce debit transactions by July 1, 2023. In October 2023, the Federal Reserve issued a proposal for comment that further lowers debit interchange rates, with a mechanism for automatic adjustment every two years. Finally, in August 2025, the District Court for the District of North Dakota ruled that the Federal Reserve exceeded its authority in implementing Regulation II, which sets debit card interchange fees. The court found the Federal Reserve improperly included various costs beyond what the Durbin Amendment allows, such as fraud losses, network fees and other fixed costs, when setting the debit interchange fee standard. As a result, the court vacated Regulation II’s debit interchange fee 21 21 21 21 21 21 Table of Contents Table of Contents Table of Contents standard. Subsequently, however, the District Court in Kentucky ruled that the Federal Reserve acted within its discretion in setting the debit interchange cap. If the District Court of North Dakota’s decision is affirmed on appeal and ultimately prevails, it could potentially result in the Federal Reserve setting a significantly lower interchange cap for relevant debit transactions in the U.S. Separately, there continues to be interest in regulation of credit interchange fees and routing practices by members of Congress and state legislators. It is possible that the Credit Card Competition Act may be reintroduced in Congress or attempted to be offered as an amendment to unrelated legislation. Previous versions of the legislation were introduced in 2022 and 2023, and required among other things, that large issuing banks offer a choice of at least two unaffiliated networks over which electronic credit transactions may be processed. Finally, some states have passed or are considering passing laws that regulate how interchange can be set and assessed. For example, in May 2024, Illinois passed a law that restricts the assessment of interchange on the state tax and gratuity portions of a transaction, and restricts financial institutions and payment networks, among others, from using payment transaction data for any purpose other than facilitating or processing a transaction. While the Illinois law remains subject to legal challenge, if such laws are allowed to go into effect, they may also impose significant technical and compliance burdens on our business. •In Europe, the EU’s IFR places an effective cap on consumer credit and consumer debit interchange fees for both domestic and cross-border transactions within the European Economic Area of 30 basis points and 20 basis points, respectively. EU member states have the ability to further reduce these interchange levels within their territories. The European Commission has announced its intention to conduct another impact assessment of the IFR, which could result in even lower caps on interchange rates and the expansion of regulation to other types of products, services and fees. •Several countries in Latin America continue to explore regulatory measures against payments networks and have either adopted or are exploring interchange caps, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica. In Asia Pacific, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) which already regulates interchange, recently proposed reducing existing interchange caps on domestic credit and debit transactions and not allowing differential interchange treatment for consumer and commercial transactions. Similarly, in New Zealand, the Commerce Commission recently lowered existing caps on domestic credit transactions. Interchange is also regulated in certain countries in the Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa region, including the United Arab Emirates. Finally, many governments, including but not limited to governments in India, Costa Rica, and Turkey, are using regulation to further drive down MDR, which could negatively affect the economics of our transactions. •While the focus of interchange and MDR regulation has primarily been on domestic rates, interest on cross-border rates has been growing. For example, we agreed to limit certain cross-border interchange rates in a settlement with the European Commission in 2019, which was extended through 2029. In 2020, Costa Rica became the first country to formally regulate cross-border interchange rates by regulation. In June 2022, the UK’s PSR initiated a market review focusing on post-Brexit increases in interchange rates for e-commerce transactions between the UK and Europe and is proposing to cap cross-border interchange on certain transactions in that geographic corridor. Most recently, in July 2025, New Zealand adopted interchange caps on cross-border transactions including commercial credit transactions. Australia has also proposed adopting caps for cross-border transactions. Cross-border MDR is also regulated in Costa Rica and Turkey. •With increased lobbying by sellers and other industry participants, we are also beginning to see regulatory interest in network fees. For example, the UK’s PSR is conducting a market review into scheme and processing fees. In its interim report, the PSR indicated that it is reviewing possible remedies in the areas of governance, reporting and transparency, any of which, if adopted, could impose additional complexity and burdens on our business in the UK. Other regulators, for example, those in Australia, the EU, Chile and New Zealand have expressed an interest in network fees, including issues related to transparency. Finally, in 2024, the Greek Parliament limited acquirer fees for certain small ticket transactions in some seller categories for a period of three years. •In addition, industry participants in some countries, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa and Turkey have sought intervention from competition regulators or filed claims relating to certain network rules, including Visa’s restrictions on cross-border acquiring. The Central Banks of Chile and the Dominican Republic recently enacted regulation that will permit cross-border acquiring for ecommerce transactions under certain conditions. Other countries, like Brazil, have adopted regulations that require us to seek government pre-approval for certain of our network rules, which could also impact the way we operate in those markets. 22 22 22 22 22 22 Table of Contents Table of Contents Table of Contents •Government regulations or pressure may also impact our rules and practices and require us to allow other payments networks to support Visa products or services, to have the other networks’ functionality or brand marks on our products, or to share our intellectual property with other networks. In addition, the EU’s requirement to separate scheme and processing adds costs and impacts the execution of our commercial, innovation and product strategies. •We are also subject to central bank oversight in a growing number of countries, including Brazil, India, the UK and within the EU. In several jurisdictions, we have been designated as a “systemically important payment system.” Some countries with existing oversight frameworks are looking to further enhance their regulatory powers, while regulators in other jurisdictions are considering or adopting approaches based on these regulatory principles. For example, in October 2023, VisaNet was designated as a prominent payment system in Canada. These types of designations generally result in oversight of authorization, clearing and settlement activities, including policies, procedures and requirements related to governance, client and seller access to our payment systems, reporting, cybersecurity, processing infrastructure, capital and/or credit risk management. We could also be required to adopt policies and practices designed to mitigate settlement and liquidity risks, including increased requirements to maintain sufficient levels of capital and financial resources locally, as well as localized risk management or governance. •As innovations in payment technology have enabled us to expand into new products and services, they have also expanded the potential scope of regulatory influence. For instance, new products and capabilities, including tokenization, push payments and cross-border money movement solutions could bring increased licensing or authorization requirements in the countries where the product or capability is offered. Furthermore, certain portions of our business are regulated as payment institutions or as money transmitters, subjecting us to various licensing, supervisory and other requirements. As we continue to expand our capabilities and offerings in furtherance of our multi-year growth strategy, we will need to obtain new types of licenses. These licenses could result in increased supervisory and compliance obligations that are distinct from the obligations we are subject to in our capacity as a payment card network. Regulators around the world increasingly take note of each other’s approaches to regulating the payments industry. Consequently, development in one jurisdiction may influence regulatory approaches in another. The risks created by a new law, regulation or regulatory outcome in one jurisdiction have the potential to be replicated and to negatively affect our business in another jurisdiction or in other product offerings. For example, our settlement with the European Commission on cross-border interchange rates has drawn attention from some regulators in other parts of the world. Similarly, new regulations involving one product offering may prompt regulators to extend the regulations to other product offerings. For example, credit payments could become subject to similar regulation as debit payments (or vice versa). The RBA initially capped credit interchange, but subsequently capped debit interchange as well. When we cannot set default interchange reimbursement rates at optimal levels, issuers and acquirers may find our payments system less attractive. This may increase the attractiveness of other payments systems, such as our competitors’ closed-loop payments systems with direct connections to both sellers and consumers. We believe some issuers may react to such regulations by charging new or higher fees, or reducing certain benefits to consumers, which makes our products less appealing to consumers. Some acquirers may elect to charge higher MDR regardless of the Visa interchange reimbursement rate, causing sellers not to accept our products or to steer consumers to alternative payments systems or forms of payment. In addition, in an effort to reduce the expense of their payment programs, some issuers and acquirers have obtained, and may continue to obtain, incentives from us, including reductions in the fees that we charge, which directly impacts our net revenue. The evolving and increasing regulatory focus on the payments industry could negatively impact or reduce the number of Visa products our clients issue, the volume of payments we process, our net revenue, our brands, our competitive positioning, our ability to use our intellectual property to differentiate our products and services, the quality and types of products and services we offer, the countries in which our products and services are used, and the types of consumers and sellers who can obtain or accept our products and services, all of which could harm our business and financial results. Finally, policymakers and regulatory bodies in the U.S., Europe and other parts of the world are exploring ways to reform existing competition laws to meet the needs of the digital economy, including restricting large technology companies from engaging in mergers and acquisitions, requiring them to interoperate with potential competitors, and prohibiting certain kinds of self-preferencing behaviors. While the focus of these efforts remains primarily on increasing regulation of large technology, ecommerce and social media companies, they could also have implications for other types of companies including payments networks, which could constrain our ability to 23 23 23 23 23 23 Table of Contents Table of Contents Table of Contents effectively manage our business. Recent political developments around the world, including recent shifts in trade policy, have added additional uncertainty with respect to new laws and regulations or changes in the interpretations or enforcement of existing laws and regulations, and increased risk of financial regulatory fragmentation."
    }
  ],
  "full_url": "https://riskdiff.com/v/2026-vs-2025/full/"
}