Valero Energy Corporation: 10-K Risk Factor Changes

Our financial results are affected by the margin (i.e., the difference) between our product prices and the prices for crude oil, corn, and other feedstocks that we purchase, which can vary greatly based on global and regional market conditions, as well as by type and class of product or feedstock. Historically, product margins have been volatile, and we believe they will continue to be volatile in the future. The prices we pay to acquire feedstocks and the market prices at which we can ultimately sell our products depend upon several factors, including global and regional supplies, inventory levels, and availability of and demand for feedstocks, liquid transportation fuels, and other products. These in turn depend on, among other things, global and regional production levels, or capacities of suppliers and competitors; operational costs and flexibility (including natural gas, electricity, and water availability and costs); transportation and logistics availability and costs; proximity and access to product and feedstock supplies and markets; economic activity and growth levels; U.S. and foreign relations (including tariffs, duties, sanctions, or other trade restrictions); political affairs; government regulations; and the events described in many of the other risk factors below. The ability of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other petroleum-producing nations that collectively make up OPEC+ to agree on and to maintain crude oil price and production controls has also had, and is likely to continue to have, a significant impact on the market prices of crude oil and certain of our products. Although several refinery closures have recently been announced or are in process and others are expected in the future, there have also been recent additions to global refining capacity, which create risks and uncertainties related to product margins, volatility, and market perceptions of the refining industry. Regarding low-carbon fuels margins, see also, among other risk factors set forth below, “The availability and prices of our feedstocks and other critical supplies expose us to risks,” and “We are subject to risks arising from the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs, and other regulations, policies, international certifications, and standards impacting low-carbon fuels.” Many of these factors are interrelated, beyond our control, can vary globally and regionally, and may change quickly, adding to market volatility, while others may have longer-term effects that are uncertain. We do not produce any of our primary feedstocks (other than DCOs produced by our ethanol plants), and must purchase nearly all of the feedstocks we process. We generally purchase our feedstocks long before we process them and sell the resulting products. Price level changes during the period between purchasing feedstocks and selling the resulting products have had, and could continue to have, a significant effect on our financial results. A decline in market prices for our products and feedstocks has also had, and could again have, a negative impact to the carrying value of our inventories. Factors outside of our control, such as economic, legal, regulatory, and political uncertainties; global geopolitical and other conflicts and tensions; inflation (and the potential for increased prices to reduce demand); prolonged periods of high interest rates; and public health crises (such as pandemics or epidemics) have negatively affected, and many such factors could continue to negatively affect, economic activity and growth levels of the U.S. 17 17 17 Table of Contents Table of Contents and other countries. In turn, the demand for and consumption of our products, and also our revenues, margins, growth prospects, and capital allocation decisions have been and could again be negatively impacted. A significant portion of our profitability is derived from the ability to purchase and process crude oil feedstocks that historically have been cheaper than benchmark crude oils. These crude oil feedstock differentials vary significantly depending on many factors, including global and regional economic conditions, trends and conditions within crude oil and refined petroleum products markets, and the events described above and in many of the other risk factors below. Previous declines in such differentials have had, and any future declines will likely again have, a negative impact on our results of operations.

Our financial results are affected by the relationship, or margin, between our product prices and the prices for crude oil, corn, and other feedstocks that we purchase, which can vary based on global and regional market conditions, as well as by type and class of product or feedstock. Historically, product margins have been volatile, and we believe they will continue to be volatile in the future. Our cost to acquire feedstocks and the price at which we can ultimately sell products depend upon several factors beyond our control, including global and regional supplies, inventory levels, and availability of and demand for feedstocks (such as crude oil, waste and renewable feedstocks, and corn), liquid transportation fuels (such as gasoline, diesel, renewable diesel, SAF, and ethanol), and other products. These in turn depend on, among other things, global and regional production levels or capacities of suppliers and competitors, natural gas and electricity availability and costs, economic activity and growth levels (or the lack thereof), U.S. and foreign relations, political affairs, government regulations, and the events described in many of the other risk factors below. The ability of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other petroleum-producing nations that collectively make up OPEC+ to agree on and to maintain crude oil price and production controls has also had, and is likely to continue to have, a significant impact on the market prices of crude oil and certain of our products. Although several refinery closures have recently been announced and others are expected in the future, there have also been recent additions to global refining capacity, which create risks and uncertainties related to product margins, volatility, and market perceptions of the refining industry. Regarding low-carbon fuels margins, see also, among other risk factors set forth below, “We are subject to risks arising from the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs, and other regulations, policies, international certifications, and standards impacting low-carbon fuels.” Some of these factors can vary globally or regionally and may change quickly, adding to market volatility, while others may have longer-term effects. The longer-term effects of these and other factors on product margins are uncertain. We do not produce crude oil, waste or renewable feedstocks (except inedible DCOs), corn, or other primary feedstocks, and must purchase nearly all of the feedstocks we process. We generally purchase our feedstocks long before we process them and sell the resulting products. Price level changes during the period between purchasing feedstocks and selling the resulting products have had, and could continue to have, a significant effect on our financial results. A decline in market prices for our products and feedstocks has also had, and could again have, a negative impact to the carrying value of our inventories. Factors outside of our control, such as economic, legal, regulatory, and political uncertainties, global geopolitical and other conflicts and tensions, inflation (and the potential for increased prices to reduce demand), prolonged periods of high interest rates, and public health crises (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) have negatively affected, and many such factors could continue to negatively affect, economic activity and growth levels of the U.S. and other countries. In turn, the demand for and consumption of our products, and also our revenues, margins, growth prospects, and capital allocation decisions have been and could again be negatively impacted. 17 17 17 Table of Contents Table of Contents A significant portion of our profitability is derived from the ability to purchase and process crude oil feedstocks that historically have been cheaper than benchmark crude oils. These crude oil feedstock differentials vary significantly depending on many factors, including global and regional economic conditions, trends and conditions within crude oil and refined petroleum products markets, and the events described above and in many of the other risk factors below. Previous declines in such differentials have had, and any future declines will likely again have, a negative impact on our results of operations.

Along with our own data and information in the normal course of our business, we collect and retain certain data that is subject to specific laws and regulations. The compliant processing of this data domestically and transferring of this data across international borders continue to increase in complexity, which has, and will likely continue, to impose increased efforts and costs on company resources for compliance functions related thereto. This data is subject to regulation at various levels of government in many areas of our business and in jurisdictions across the world, including data privacy and security laws such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation, the U.K. Data Protection Act 2018, Quebec’s Bill 64, the California Consumer Privacy Act, as amended by the California Privacy Rights Act, and various other comprehensive privacy laws passed by other U.S. states. We also operate in other jurisdictions with comprehensive data privacy laws and regulations (such as Mexico and Peru), and other jurisdictions are considering issuing similar laws and regulations. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has also adopted rules requiring the reporting of certain data breaches. As the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of such laws continues to progress and evolve, there may also be developments that amplify such risks. Any failure by us to comply with these laws and regulations could expose us to litigation and enforcement. The growing sophistication and implementation of advanced AI technologies also increases the risks we face related to data privacy and security.

Along with our own data and information in the normal course of our business, we collect and retain certain data that is subject to specific laws and regulations. The compliant processing of this data domestically and transferring of this data across international borders continues to increase in complexity, which has, and will likely continue, to impose increased strains on company resources for compliance functions related thereto. This data is subject to regulation at various levels of government in many areas of our business and in jurisdictions across the world, including data privacy and security laws such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation, the U.K. Data Protection Act 2018, Quebec’s Bill 64, the California Consumer Privacy Act, as amended by the California Privacy Rights Act, and various other comprehensive privacy laws passed by other U.S. states. We also operate in other jurisdictions (such as Mexico and Peru) that have issued, or are considering issuing, data privacy laws and regulations. Additionally, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has adopted rules requiring the reporting of certain data breaches. As the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of such laws continues to progress and evolve, there may also be developments that amplify such risks. Any failure by us to comply with these laws and regulations could expose us to litigation and regulatory enforcement.

We could face increased climate‐related litigation with respect to our operations, disclosures, or products. Governments, non-governmental organizations, and private parties across the world have filed lawsuits or initiated regulatory action against fossil fuel companies. Such lawsuits and actions often allege noncompliance with applicable laws or regulations, or personal injury or damages they attribute to perceived climate-related harms, and seek damages and/or abatement under various tort and other theories, including under consumer protection, human rights, or constitutional provisions. We have been named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit in state court by a county in Oregon seeking significant damages and abatement under various tort theories (including deceptive disclosures). We have also been named as a co-defendant in a federal class-action lawsuit in California alleging antitrust and consumer protection 27 27 27 Table of Contents Table of Contents claims related to costs of complying with the LCFS. While we intend to vigorously defend against the allegations in those pending actions, the ultimate outcomes and impacts to us cannot be predicted with certainty at this time, we could incur substantial legal costs and reputational damage associated with defending such matters, and an adverse ruling could require us to pay significant damages. From time to time, we have also been subject to, and expect to continue to be subject to, other litigation related to environmental, health, and safety incidents or other accidents arising in the normal course of our operations. Our industry in particular has been subject to a rising number of lawsuits seeking substantial damage awards in such matters, which have been exacerbated by recent legal, judicial, and jury-related trends in certain jurisdictions where we operate. We have faced, and expect to continue to face, increased risks related to such matters and the outcome of pending or future claims for such matters could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Governments and private parties are also increasingly filing lawsuits or initiating regulatory action based on allegations that certain public statements and disclosures by companies regarding climate- and other sustainability-related matters are false or misleading “greenwashing” that violate deceptive trade practices, consumer protection statutes, or other similar laws and regulations, or are fraudulent or misleading under certain corporate or securities laws and regulations. The states of New York and Vermont have also enacted legislation establishing various cost recovery programs designed to upgrade infrastructure and fund community initiatives they designate as purported climate mitigation investments, under which “responsible parties,” which the programs have deemed to include refiners and other fossil fuel companies, bear the costs on a strict liability basis, and other U.S. states have proposed or are considering similar legislation. Certain governmental authorities have also sought to attribute blame for certain perceived climate-related matters primarily to fossil fuel companies, and some are considering legislation that would create private causes of action making them strictly liable for damages incurred in certain natural catastrophes and weather events. These matters present a high degree of uncertainty, including due to legal viability, regarding the extent to which fossil fuel companies face an increased risk of liability and reputational damage stemming from alleged climate- and other sustainability-related matters. Various U.S. state and local governments have also proposed or are considering imposing taxes, fees, assessments, or tax abatement limitations on fossil fuel companies. In addition to voluntary disclosures in response to investor and stakeholder requests discussed above, many governments have also proposed or adopted regulations that impose disclosure obligations with respect to various climate-related matters and other sustainability-related matters. In October 2023, California adopted a host of broad and far-reaching climate-related disclosure obligations, including with respect to GHG emissions, climate-related financial-risk reporting, and statements regarding GHG emissions reductions; and carbon offsets, certain of which are currently subject to ongoing litigation and potential delays, creating substantial uncertainty. New York also recently adopted certain GHG reporting requirements that are even broader in scope than California’s and require extremely burdensome (perhaps even infeasible) and detailed disclosures, including with respect to the quantity and type of fuel and feedstock related to such emissions. Other U.S. states have proposed or announced disclosure obligations with respect to climate-related matters. The U.K. has adopted and the EU has provisionally adopted certain burdensome disclosures related to various environmental, climate, social, supply chain, human rights, and other sustainability-related matters. In the EU, these include its Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and its Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which also provides a private cause of action. Although the scope of CSRD and CSDDD have been simplified with provisional agreements by applicable governance bodies within the EU, endorsement and formal adoption are still pending. Further, the scope and extent to which the CSRD and the CSDDD will require any extraterritorial disclosure obligations on non-EU parent companies remains unknown and presents considerable uncertainty for many companies, including us. Some governments have also adopted laws 28 28 28 Table of Contents Table of Contents and regulations, or have launched investigations and requested information, based on pricing practices in the fossil fuel industry, which we have been and may again be subject to. For example, California’s Oil Refinery Cost Disclosure Act (SB 1322) requires refineries in California to report monthly on the volume and cost of the crude oil they buy, the quantity and price of the wholesale gasoline they sell, and the gross gasoline margin per barrel, among other information. Some governments and other third parties we do business with have also begun requesting product-specific climate-related disclosures from us in connection with their own reporting. At the same time, in September 2025, the EPA proposed to effectively cease its Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, which presents uncertainties with respect to future climate-related reporting methodologies that are utilized. Our efforts to comply with these laws, regulations, and requests impose a strain on company resources and expose us to risk by requiring disclosure of information that (i) may be protected trade secrets and/or competitively sensitive; (ii) exposes us to litigation and enforcement; (iii) may be inconsistent with other standards or requirements that are subject to ongoing change and uncertainty, or our current practices that may utilize different methodologies or standards; (iv) is subject to many assumptions and inherent calculation difficulties, such as accuracy, completeness, and dependence on third parties; (v) may be perceived in ways that adversely impact our business relationships, credibility, and reputation; and (vi) may be infeasible to obtain or report. The costs, burdens, and risks imposed by the foregoing may cause us to alter our business and operations in certain locations.

We could face increased climate‐related litigation with respect to our operations, disclosures, or products. Governments and private parties across the world have filed lawsuits or initiated regulatory action against fossil fuel companies. Such lawsuits and actions often allege noncompliance with applicable laws or regulations, or damages they attribute to perceived climate-related matters, and seek damages and/or abatement under various tort and other theories, including under consumer protection, human rights, or constitutional provisions. We have been named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit in state court by a county in Oregon seeking significant damages and abatement under various tort theories (including deceptive disclosures). We intend to vigorously defend against the allegations. However, the ultimate outcome and impact to us of such litigation cannot be predicted with certainty at this time, and we could incur substantial legal costs and reputational damage associated with defending such matter, and an adverse ruling could require us to pay significant damages. Similar lawsuits may be filed in other jurisdictions. Governments and private parties are also increasingly filing lawsuits or initiating regulatory action based on allegations that certain public statements and disclosures by companies regarding climate-related matters and other sustainability-related matters are false or misleading “greenwashing” that violate deceptive trade practices, consumer protection statutes, or other similar laws and regulations, or are fraudulent or misleading under applicable corporate or securities laws and regulations. Similar issues can also arise relating to aspirational statements, such as net-zero or carbon neutrality targets, or alignment with certain third-party frameworks or standards that are made without an adequate basis to support such statements. The states of New York and Vermont have also enacted legislation establishing various cost recovery programs designed to upgrade infrastructure and fund community initiatives they designate as purported climate mitigation investments, under which “responsible parties,” which the programs have deemed to include refiners and other fossil fuel companies, bear the costs on a strict liability basis, and other U.S. states have proposed or are considering similar legislation. Certain governmental authorities have also sought to attribute blame for certain perceived climate-related matters primarily to fossil fuel companies, and some are considering legislation that would create private causes of action making them strictly liable for damages incurred in certain natural catastrophes and weather events. These matters present a high degree of uncertainty regarding the extent to which fossil fuel companies face an increased risk of liability and reputational damage stemming from alleged climate-related and other sustainability-related matters. Various U.S. state and local governments have also proposed or are considering imposing taxes (including a recent ballot measure in California), fees, assessments, or tax abatement limitations on fossil fuel companies. See also Note 2 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. In addition to voluntary disclosures in response to investor and stakeholder requests, many governments have also proposed or adopted regulations that impose disclosure obligations with respect to various climate-related matters and other sustainability-related matters. For example, in March 2024, the SEC adopted sweeping and novel disclosure obligations with respect to GHG emissions reporting, which are currently stayed pending litigation. In addition, in October 2023, California adopted a host of broad and far-reaching climate-related disclosure obligations, including with respect to GHG emissions, climate-related financial-risk reporting, and statements regarding GHG emissions reductions. Other U.S. states have announced or proposed similar regulations. The U.K., Canada, and the EU have also passed laws 28 28 28 Table of Contents Table of Contents requiring various burdensome disclosures related to various environmental, climate, social, supply chain, human rights, and other sustainability-related matters. These include, among others, the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and its Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which also provides a private cause of action. Other jurisdictions are considering sustainability-related disclosure laws. Some governments have also adopted regulations, or are launching investigations and requesting information, based on pricing practices in the fossil fuel industry. For example, in September 2022, California adopted the Oil Refinery Cost Disclosure Act (SB 1322), which requires refineries in California to report monthly on the volume and cost of the crude oil they buy, the quantity and price of the wholesale gasoline they sell, and the gross gasoline margin per barrel, among other information. Some third parties (including governments) we do business with have begun requesting product-specific GHG emissions disclosures from us in connection with their own reporting or goals. Our efforts to comply with these and other requests and regulations impose a strain on company resources and expose us to risk by requiring disclosure of information that (i) may be protected trade secrets and/or competitively sensitive information, (ii) exposes us to litigation and regulatory actions and investigations, (iii) is inconsistent with other government regulations or our current practices that may utilize different methodologies or standards, (iv) is subject to many assumptions and inherent calculation difficulties, such as accuracy, completeness, and dependence on third parties, and (v) may be perceived in ways that adversely impact our business relationships, credibility, and reputation.

A reduction in the demand for our products could result from events and trends such as increases in fuel efficiency, decreases in travel or fuel consumption levels, and a transition by consumers to alternative fuel vehicles, such as electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles, in each case, whether as a result of government mandates, incentives, or actions (including foreign dumping), industry developments, societal changes, or sentiment or perception with respect to our products, or fossil fuels and GHG emissions generally. New developments may alter consumer fuel or energy preferences or make alternative fuel vehicles more affordable or desirable, including improvements in battery and storage technology, increases in driving ranges, increased availability of charging stations and other infrastructure, expanded and more reliable supply chains, autonomous driving capabilities, improvements in hydrogen fuel cell technology, and other technological changes. Any such developments could increase consumer acceptance and result in greater 22 22 22 Table of Contents Table of Contents market penetration of alternative fuel vehicles or otherwise decrease the demand for our products. There may also be new entrants into the low-carbon fuels industry or developments by current competitors that could meet the market’s demands in a more efficient or less costly manner than our technologies and products. Competition within the global ethanol industry also continues to grow. The demand for many of our low-carbon fuels may significantly decline without sufficient and continued government support and incentives therefor, and if our competitors are able to capture the benefits from such government support and incentives to a greater degree than we are it may place us at a competitive disadvantage. While we cannot currently predict the ultimate form, timing, or extent of these developments, any such event could materially and adversely affect our margins and sales volumes, and in turn our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity.

A reduction in the demand for our products could result from events and trends such as increases in fuel efficiency, decreases in travel or fuel consumption levels, and a transition by consumers to alternative fuel vehicles, such as electric vehicles (EVs) and hybrid vehicles, in each case, whether as a result of government mandates or incentives, industry developments, societal changes, or sentiment or perception with respect to our products, or fossil fuels and GHG emissions generally. New developments may alter consumer fuel or energy preferences or make alternative fuel vehicles more affordable or desirable, including improvements in battery and storage technology, increases in driving ranges, increased availability of charging stations and other infrastructure, expanded and more reliable supply chains, improvements in hydrogen fuel cell technology, and other technological changes. Any such developments could increase consumer acceptance and result in greater market penetration of alternative fuel vehicles or otherwise decrease the demand for our products. There may also be new entrants into the low-carbon fuels industry that could meet demand for lower-carbon transportation fuels and modes of transportation in a more efficient or less costly manner than our technologies and products. Other companies have made, or announced interest in making, investments in renewable diesel, SAF, and other low-carbon projects. As a result, our low-carbon fuels businesses have faced, and will likely continue to face, increased competition for feedstocks and customers. While we cannot currently predict the ultimate form, timing, or extent of these developments, any such event could materially and adversely affect our margins and sales volumes, and in turn our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity.

Our operations depend on the reliable supply of natural gas, electricity, and water. We consume significant amounts of natural gas, electricity, and water to operate our refineries and plants, and the prices thereof can have a measurable effect on the total cost of our operations. Volatility in the prices for natural gas and electricity, in particular, is an ongoing risk to such costs. We also purchase other commodities whose prices may vary depending on the prices of natural gas, electricity, and water. The availability and prices of natural gas, electricity, and water have been, and could continue to be, affected by numerous events, such as (as applicable) government regulations or actions (including sanctions); rationing and curtailment; rate increases; weather (e.g., droughts, hurricanes, and periods of extreme heat or cold); logistics interruptions; electric grid outages; cybersecurity incidents; intermittent electricity generation (particularly from wind and solar); hostilities; terrorism; protests; human error; population and industry growth; infrastructure or supply mismanagement; and supply and demand imbalances. For example, the real-time market structure of the largest grid operator in Texas exposes many of our refineries and operations located in Texas to “scarcity pricing” during periods of supply and demand imbalance. As electrification continues to grow, or if there are increased restrictions or costs imposed on the ability of utilities or power suppliers to utilize certain energy sources (such as through restrictions on, or other pressure not to use, fossil fuel or nuclear-generated electricity), there will likely be increased strains on and risks to the integrity, reliability, and resilience of electrical grids, and increased volatility and tightness in natural gas and electricity supplies across the world. These events could negatively affect the cost, reliability, and availability of our natural gas and electricity supplies and may cause sporadic outages disrupting our operations. Growing electrification and rapidly developing and increasing technology use (such as artificial intelligence (AI), computer processing, cryptocurrency mining, and cloud storage, as well as the data centers and power supplies required to support these activities) will also likely increase the intermittency and decrease the reliability of electricity supplies, particularly for grids highly dependent upon wind and solar power, which exacerbate the foregoing challenges, including by increasing costs. Government and private impediments and opposition to certain infrastructure projects (including pipelines) have also resulted in, and could continue to result in, the underinvestment in, or unavailability of, the infrastructure and logistics assets needed to transport and obtain natural gas, electricity, and water in a reliable and cost-efficient manner. We actively manage these risks through contracting and, in the case of natural gas and electricity, hedging, as appropriate, and by pursuing projects that reduce our reliance on third parties and fortify the resilience of our assets and supplies. However, increases in the prices for natural gas and electricity, and disruptions to our supplies thereof, have had, and could again have, a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Certain of our refineries in Texas have also recently experienced various water supply challenges that remain ongoing to various degrees and in certain instances have resulted in, or are 18 18 18 Table of Contents Table of Contents expected to result in, additional capital expenditures and/or ongoing costs. We could experience additional water supply challenges in the future.

Our operations depend on the reliable supply of natural gas and electricity. We consume significant amounts of natural gas and electricity to operate our refineries and plants, and natural gas and electricity prices have a measurable effect on the total cost of our operations. We also purchase other commodities whose prices may vary depending on the prices of natural gas or electricity. The volatility of prices for both natural gas and electricity represent an ongoing challenge to our operating results. Additionally, the availability and cost of natural gas and electricity have been, and could continue to be, affected by numerous events, such as government regulations, rate increases, weather (e.g., hurricanes and periods of extreme heat or cold), logistics interruptions, electric grid outages, cybersecurity incidents, intermittent electricity generation (particularly from wind and solar), hostilities, terrorism, protests, sanctions, human error, and supply and demand imbalances for natural gas and electricity. For example, the real-time market structure of the largest grid operator in Texas exposes many of our refineries and operations located in Texas to “scarcity pricing” during periods of supply and demand imbalance. As electrification continues to grow, or if there are increased restrictions or costs imposed on the ability of utilities or power suppliers to utilize certain energy sources (such as through restrictions on, or other pressure not to use, fossil fuel or nuclear-generated electricity), there will likely be increased strains on and risks to the integrity, reliability, and resilience of electrical grids, and increased volatility and tightness in natural gas and electricity supplies across the world. These events could negatively affect the cost, reliability, and availability of our natural gas and electricity supplies and may cause sporadic outages disrupting our operations. Growing electrification and rapidly developing and increasing technology use (such as artificial intelligence (AI), computer processing, cryptocurrency mining, and cloud storage, and the data centers and power supplies required to support these activities) will also likely increase the intermittency and decrease the reliability of electricity supplies, particularly for grids highly dependent upon wind and solar power, which would exacerbate the foregoing challenges, including increasing costs. Increased 19 19 19 Table of Contents Table of Contents government regulations and opposition to pipeline construction and electricity generation and transmission projects have also resulted in, and could continue to result in, the underinvestment in, or unavailability of, the infrastructure and logistics assets needed to obtain natural gas and electricity in a reliable and cost-efficient manner. While we actively manage these risks through contracting and hedging our exposure to price volatility as appropriate, and by pursuing projects that reduce our reliance on third parties and fortify the resilience of our assets, increases in prices for natural gas and electricity, or disruptions to our supplies thereof, have had, and could again have, a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity.

We source our petroleum-based and low-carbon fuel feedstocks, as well as many other critical supplies, such as catalyst, chemicals, treating materials, and metal-based consumables, from suppliers throughout the world. We are, therefore, subject to the legal, political, geographic, and economic risks attendant to doing business with suppliers located in, and supplies originating from, different areas across the world. If one or more of our supply contracts were terminated, or if legal, government, political, or other developments (including global geopolitical and other conflicts and tensions) were to disrupt our traditional feedstock and other critical supplies, we believe that adequate alternative supplies would be available, but it is possible that we would be unable to obtain adequate or optimal alternative sources of supply, or would be able to do so only at unfavorable prices or costs. Our refineries and plants without access to waterborne deliveries or offtake must rely on rail, pipeline, or ground transportation and thus have been, and will likely continue to be, more susceptible to such risks. If we are unable to obtain adequate or optimal supplies, or are able to do so only at unfavorable prices or costs, our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity could be materially and adversely affected, including from reduced product sales volumes, curtailed production, lower product margins, and higher operating costs. The U.S. and other governments can also prevent or restrict us from doing business involving other countries. U.S. and other government sanctions and actions by governments and private parties to refrain from purchasing or transporting crude oil and petroleum-based products from particular countries (such as Russia and Iran) have impacted, and may continue to impact, trade flows and our access to certain business opportunities. There is also ongoing uncertainty regarding the ultimate impacts of recent events involving Venezuela, including with respect to foreign trade and product margins, among others. Feedstock sourcing has also been the subject of scrutiny for certain crude oils we process, and shifting legislative, regulatory, and market sentiment regarding various sources of crude oil supply has previously resulted in adverse consequences with respect to our refineries, such as the denial or delay of permits to construct refinery projects that facilitate the processing of crude oil from particular sources. Similar events may occur in the future. Comparable scrutiny and shifting sentiment have occurred with respect to certain feedstocks for our low-carbon fuels business as described in the paragraph below and in the cross-reference therein. The U.S. federal government under the current administration has also implemented and indicated the potential for new or revised tariffs, duties, sanctions, and other actions with respect to U.S. and foreign trade, manufacturing, and investment, and some foreign governments have in turn implemented or indicated the potential for similar responses impacting U.S. goods and/or foreign operations and business dealings of U.S. companies. While there continues to be a lack of certainty around the ongoing likelihood, timing, and details with respect to the continuation or future invalidation, expansion, revision, or implementation of such actions, as well as the impact of litigation and consequent court orders, such actions have in certain instances had, and could again have, an adverse effect on our ability to obtain optimal or adequate volumes of feedstocks and other critical supplies at favorable prices and costs. Our Refining and Ethanol segments have not been significantly impacted to date by recent U.S. tariffs and foreign duties. However, DGD’s foreign feedstock supplies have recently been impacted, and could continue to be impacted, by U.S. tariffs, as well as by many of the other developments discussed in “We are subject to risks arising from the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs, and other regulations, policies, international certifications, and standards impacting low-carbon fuels.” The impacts thereof have been compounded by the fact that U.S.-produced renewable diesel and SAF have recently been subject to duties in several foreign jurisdictions, while similar duties have not been broadly applied to 19 19 19 Table of Contents Table of Contents imports into the U.S. of foreign renewable diesel and SAF (as finished products), nor have foreign jurisdictions broadly levied tariffs similar to the U.S. on feedstocks that foreign renewable diesel and SAF producers may import and use to produce such products outside the U.S. These events have at times made DGD’s use of certain feedstocks (particularly foreign feedstocks) economically impractical, and resulted in reduced margins, curtailed production, and potentially reduced access to certain product markets due to competitive cost disadvantages, which have had, and could continue to have, an adverse impact on its and our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Our Ethanol segment relies on corn sourced from local farmers and commercial elevators in the Mid-Continent region of the U.S. and such supply is acutely exposed to the effects that weather and other environmental events in that region can have on the amount or timing of crop production. Crop production is also affected by government policies (such as farming subsidies and the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs), and market events (such as changes in fertilizer prices and rail disruptions). Reductions or delays in crop production from these and other events could negatively impact the availability and price of corn for our Ethanol segment, and such events have occurred periodically.

We source our petroleum-based and low-carbon fuel feedstocks, as well as many other critical supplies, such as catalyst, chemicals, treating materials, and metal-based consumables from suppliers throughout the world. We are, therefore, subject to the political, geographic, and economic risks attendant to doing business with suppliers located in, and supplies originating from, different areas across the world, including global geopolitical and other conflicts and tensions (such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and turmoil in the Middle East and other producing regions) that have impacted, and may continue to impact, trade flows and transportation costs. If one or more of our supply contracts were terminated, or if political or other events were to disrupt our traditional feedstock and other critical supplies, we believe that adequate alternative supplies would be available, but it is possible that we would be unable to find adequate or optimal alternative sources of supply. Our refineries and plants without access to waterborne deliveries or offtake must rely on rail, pipeline, or ground transportation and thus have been, and will likely continue to be, more susceptible to such risks. If we are unable to obtain adequate or optimal volumes, or are able to obtain such volumes only at increased prices or costs, our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity could be materially and adversely affected, including from reduced product sales volumes or higher operating costs. The U.S. government can also prevent or restrict us from doing business in or with other countries. For example, U.S. sanctions targeting Russia, Iran, and Venezuela limit or ban the ability of most U.S. companies to engage in petroleum-related transactions involving these countries. U.S. and other government sanctions and actions by governments and private market participants to refrain from purchasing or transporting crude oil and petroleum-based products from particular countries have impacted, and may continue to impact, trade flows, and our access to business opportunities in various countries. The U.S. federal government under the current presidential administration has also implemented and indicated the potential for new or revised tariffs, duties, sanctions, and other actions with respect to U.S. and foreign trade, manufacturing, and investment, and some foreign governments have in turn implemented or indicated the potential for similar responses impacting U.S. goods and/or foreign operations and businesses dealings of U.S. companies. While there is currently a lack of certainty around the likelihood, timing, and details of many such actions, similar events have in the past had, and could again have, an adverse effect on our ability to obtain optimal or adequate volumes of feedstocks and other critical supplies at favorable prices and costs. Although the other joint venture member in DGD supplies some of DGD’s waste feedstock at competitive pricing, DGD must still secure a significant amount of its waste and renewable feedstock requirements from other sources. If DGD’s traditional feedstock supplies are disrupted, or become limited or only available on unfavorable terms, or if U.S. policies (such as recent IRS guidance regarding the 45Z tax credit under the IRA) disfavor foreign feedstock supplies making their use economically impracticable, DGD could be required to develop alternate sources of supply and increase its use of certain feedstocks that result in lower-margin products or curtail production. As the production of renewable diesel and other low-carbon fuels has increased, as well as the competition for feedstocks, DGD has increasingly been required to source a greater amount of its feedstocks from international sources, which intensifies its 20 20 20 Table of Contents Table of Contents exposure to political, geographic, regulatory, tax, and economic risks associated with international sourcing of supplies. Any such disruption to DGD’s feedstock supply could adversely impact its and our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Our Ethanol segment relies on corn sourced from local farmers and commercial elevators in the Mid-Continent region of the U.S., and such supply is acutely exposed to the effects that weather and other environmental events in that region can have on the amount or timing of crop production. Crop production is also affected by government policies (such as farming subsidies and low-carbon fuels incentives) and by market events (such as changes in fertilizer prices and rail disruptions). Reductions or delays in crop production from these or other events could reduce and disrupt the supply of, or otherwise increase our costs to obtain, corn for our Ethanol segment, and such events have occurred periodically.

As described under “ITEMS 1. and 2. BUSINESS AND PROPERTIES—OUR COMPREHENSIVE LIQUID FUELS STRATEGY—Regulations, Policies, and Standards Driving Low-Carbon Fuel Demand,” we strategically market our low-carbon fuels based on regional policies, regulations, standards, feedstock preferences, CI scores, and our ability to obtain fuel pathways, credits, certifications, and incentives. A significant portion of our low-carbon fuels are sold in California, Canada, the U.K., and the European Union (EU). Regarding the RFS, in June 2025, the EPA announced proposed rules (RFS Set II) that would, among other things, impose increased RVOs for 2026 and 2027, particularly with respect to biomass-based diesel, while also proposing to (i) reduce by 50 percent the number of RINs that may be generated for U.S. domestically produced renewable fuels made from foreign feedstocks, as well as for imports into the U.S. of finished renewable fuel; (ii) reduce the equivalency values for biomass-based diesel and renewable diesel produced through hydrogenation, which is used by DGD for renewable diesel and SAF production, resulting in fewer RINs generated for each gallon produced; and (iii) partially waive cellulosic biofuel volumes for 2025. In 2025, the EPA also issued decisions on hundreds of small refinery exemption (SRE) petitions that were pending, and granted full or partial exemptions on a majority of such petitions spanning RFS compliance years 2016-2024, which remain subject to ongoing litigation. As part of this action, the EPA also outlined a process for refineries granted SREs that had already retired RINs for compliance to have their RINs un-retired and returned. While RINs for compliance years prior to 2023 have expired and are expected to have little to no value, RINs for compliance years 2023 and thereafter can be used by small refineries granted SREs to update previous compliance filings, which is expected to allow up to approximately 20 percent per compliance year of a particular refinery’s RINs to be carried forward into subsequent years. In September 2025, the EPA also issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking for the proposed 2026 and 2027 RFS Set II rules that co-proposes to reallocate to RFS obligated parties (such as us) either 100 percent or 50 percent of the SRE exempted volumes that were granted for 2023 and 2024, as well as those projected to be granted for 2025 as part of the ongoing RFS Set II rulemaking (which would increase our 2026-2027 RVO obligations even further). While the final RFS Set II rules have not been finalized, the EPA’s proposals present considerable risks that the final RFS Set II rules could require RVOs for 2026-2027 that are infeasible, significantly impact RIN prices and availability, and adversely impact both our Refining and Renewable Diesel segments. The EPA has indicated it intends to finalize these rules in the first quarter of 2026, but this may be further delayed and subject to litigation, which could also delay the 2025 RFS compliance deadlines and result in additional risks and uncertainty. The risks and uncertainties with respect to the final RFS Set II rules are also interrelated with and compounded by U.S. tariffs impacting DGD’s foreign feedstock supplies and several other low-carbon fuels policies, standards, and incentives; and vice versa. For example, for fuel produced on or after January 1, 2026, the OBBB restricts eligibility for the clean fuel production credit to fuels that are derived 25 25 25 Table of Contents Table of Contents exclusively from feedstock that was produced or grown in the U.S., Mexico, or Canada, and important guidance with respect to certain aspects of such credits has yet to be finalized. Additionally, in June 2025, California’s Office of Administrative Law approved an amendment to the LCFS that seeks to reduce the CI of California’s transportation fuel pool by 30 percent by 2030 and by 90 percent by 2045 and imposes a cap on the issuance of credits for biomass-based diesel produced from soybean, canola, or sunflower oil, limiting it to 20 percent of the total credits per producer or importer, updated the model used to calculate CI, and introduced more onerous sustainability criteria for crop-based biofuels. Certain Canadian provinces have also recently imposed requirements under their low-carbon fuels standards or programs that limit the amount of imported ethanol and renewable diesel that can be claimed under the programs, and similar protectionist measures are being considered at the federal level in Canada. Further, effective January 1, 2025, the U.K. imposed additional feedstock and reporting requirements impacting SAF compared to the “Refuel EU” requirements under the EU Renewable Energy Directive. The combined effects of each of the foregoing present considerable risks and uncertainties. We are also exposed to the volatility in the market price of RINs, LCFS credits, and other credits, as described in Note 20 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. We cannot predict the future prices of such credits, which depend upon numerous factors, including (as applicable) EPA and U.S. state regulations; other U.S. and foreign laws and regulations; the events discussed above with respect to DGD’s foreign feedstock supplies; the availability of such credits for purchase; transportation fuel production levels (which can vary significantly each quarter); approved CI pathways; and CI scores. The final RFS Set II rules, the ability to sell “E15” fuel year-round, and additional actions related to SREs will likely affect RIN prices, as discussed above. For example, if the RVOs for cellulosic biofuel are high relative to D3 RIN generation, RIN prices may rise, and the EPA may or may not issue cellulosic waiver credits in time to moderate price spikes, if at all. Future RVOs for biomass-based diesel also may not reflect the ongoing impacts of U.S. tariffs, the OBBB, the LCFS, and other low-carbon fuels policies, standards, and incentives on D4 RIN generation. If an insufficient number of RINs, LCFS credits, or other credits are available for purchase (or available only at unfavorable prices), or if we are otherwise unable to meet our obligations under the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs, our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity could be adversely affected. Similar events have occurred in the past and may occur again in the future. The Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs and the U.S. federal tax incentives related to low-carbon fuels (such as the OBBB) are complex, can be subject to interpretative uncertainty, often have different or conflicting requirements or methodologies, and are frequently evolving, requiring us to periodically update our systems and controls for compliance, and imposing strains on company resources. In addition to regulation, many customers demand or prefer that the low-carbon fuels they purchase be certified through various voluntary certification bodies such as the International Sustainability and Carbon Certification system. While such certifications present business opportunities and can enhance product marketability, they also entail additional strains on company resources and risks from the loss or interruption of such certification, including decreased marketability of such products, as well as litigation and enforcement. These regulations, policies, and standards have a significant impact on the market prices of low-carbon fuel feedstocks and products, and in turn the margins on our low-carbon fuels. Our low-carbon fuels businesses could be materially and adversely affected if (i) such regulations, policies, and standards are adversely changed or interpreted, unavailable, or discontinued, including due to adverse changes in perceptions or sentiments regarding low-carbon fuels or the feedstocks used to produce them (e.g., “food vs. fuel” and concerns regarding international supply chains perceived as vulnerable to fraud); (ii) any of our low-carbon fuels products, or the feedstocks used in their production, do not comply therewith, or would result in reduced benefits or incentives thereunder, or (iii) we or an entity in our supply chain are unable to satisfy or maintain the conditions of any approved pathways or certifications 26 26 26 Table of Contents Table of Contents thereunder, or under voluntary certifications. Such changes or developments could also negatively impact our low-carbon projects. Certain such events have occurred and may continue.

As described under “ITEMS 1. and 2. BUSINESS AND PROPERTIES—OUR COMPREHENSIVE LIQUID FUELS STRATEGY—Regulations, Policies, and Standards Driving Low-Carbon Fuel Demand,” government authorities across the world have issued, are considering issuing, and/or are altering existing low-carbon fuel regulations, policies, and standards to address GHG emissions and the percentage of low-carbon fuels in the transportation fuel mix. We strategically market our low-carbon fuels based on regional policies, regulations, feedstock preferences, CI scores, and our ability to obtain fuel pathways, credits, certifications, and incentives. A significant portion of our low-carbon fuels are sold in California, Canada, and the U.K. Regarding the RFS, in June 2023, the EPA announced final rules that increase RVOs for 2023, 2024, and 2025, and in December 2024, the EPA proposed partially waiving the compliance year 2024 RVO for cellulosic biofuel, extending the reporting deadline for 2024, and revising certain biogas provisions. Regarding the LCFS, in November 2024, CARB approved updates thereto that set targets to reduce the CI of California’s transportation fuel pool by 30 percent by 2030 and by 90 percent by 2045, increase support for so called “zero-emissions” infrastructure, and make more transit agencies eligible to generate credits, although such amendments were recently paused. We are exposed to the volatility in the market price of RINs, LCFS credits, and other credits, as described in Note 20 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements. We cannot predict the future prices of RINs, LCFS credits, or other credits. Prices for RINs, LCFS credits, and other credits are dependent upon a variety of factors, including, as applicable, EPA and U.S. state regulations, regulations of other countries and jurisdictions, the availability of RINs, LCFS credits, and other credits for purchase, transportation fuel production levels (which can vary significantly each quarter), approved CI pathways, and CI scores. Future RVOs, RFS changes, the ability to sell “E15” fuel year-round, and actions related to small refinery exemptions may also affect RIN prices, and certain such actions have recently been proposed or are currently being challenged. For example, if the RVOs for cellulosic biofuel are high relative to D3 RIN generation, RIN prices may rise, and the EPA may or may not issue cellulosic waiver credits in time to moderate price spikes, if at all. If an insufficient number of RINs, LCFS credits, or other credits are available for purchase (or available only at increased prices), or if we are otherwise unable to meet our obligations under the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs (for example, if there were to be demand destruction for gasoline, diesel, and renewable fuels resulting from displacement of internal combustion engine vehicles with EVs that results in production falling short of established RVOs, an acceleration of the “blendwall,” or other significant deviations from projected volumes), our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity could be adversely affected. The adoption of any “eRIN” program could also increase RIN price volatility and result in other adverse impacts that cannot be fully predicted at this time. 26 26 26 Table of Contents Table of Contents The Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs and the U.S. federal tax incentives related to low-carbon fuels (such as the IRA) are complex, can be subject to interpretative uncertainty, often have different or conflicting requirements or methodologies, and are frequently evolving, requiring us to periodically update our systems and controls for compliance, and imposing strains on company resources. In addition to regulation, demand is growing for low-carbon fuels certified through various voluntary certification bodies such as the International Sustainability and Carbon Certification system, which presents business opportunities, but also entails additional strains on company resources. These regulations, policies, and standards have a significant impact on the market prices of low-carbon fuel feedstocks and products, and in turn the margins on our low-carbon fuels. Our low-carbon fuels businesses could be materially and adversely affected if (i) such regulations, policies, and standards are adversely changed or interpreted, unavailable, or discontinued, including due to adverse changes in the perception of low-carbon fuels, (ii) any of our low-carbon fuels products, or the feedstocks used in their production, do not comply therewith, or would result in reduced benefits or incentives thereunder, or (iii) we are unable to satisfy or maintain the conditions of any approved pathways or certifications thereunder, or under voluntary certifications. Such changes or developments could also negatively impact our low-carbon projects.

We have operations and business activities, including marketing activities, outside of the U.S., particularly in Canada, the U.K., Ireland, Mexico, and Peru, and are subject to disruptions and developments in or otherwise affecting any of these markets, including due to actual or alleged violations of laws or regulations (such as anti-bribery, anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and foreign corrupt practices violations); expropriation or impoundment of assets; failure of foreign governments and state-owned entities to honor their contracts; differential treatment or goals of state-owned entities; property disputes; economic or political instability; currency exchange rates; restrictions on the transfer of funds; tariffs, duties, and sanctions; fees; taxes or penalties; transportation delays; import and export controls; price controls; labor unrest; security issues; government decisions (including designations with respect to terrorist organizations), orders, mandates, investigations, regulations, and issuances or revocations of permits and authorizations; global geopolitical and other conflicts and tensions; changing regulatory, judicial, and political environments (such as recent changes in Mexico’s federal judiciary, hydrocarbon laws and regulations, and procedures for challenging tax authority rulings); developments with respect to policies, standards, and incentives impacting low-carbon fuels; and other developments impacting foreign trade and related matters (including any de-globalized supply chains or the diversification of historic trade patterns). Such events could result in the halting, curtailing, or cessation of operations at impacted facilities; commercial restrictions; delay, denial, or cancellation of projects, permits, and authorizations; decreased access to important business foreign opportunities and more unreliable supply chains; and increased costs, liabilities, and burdens; among other adverse impacts, and could result in a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Although we actively seek to manage these risks, we have experienced, and may again experience, certain of these events.

We have operations, including marketing activities, outside of the U.S., particularly in Canada, the U.K., Ireland, Mexico, and Peru, and are subject to disruptions and developments in any of these markets, including due to actual or alleged violations of law; expropriation or impoundment of assets; failure of foreign governments and state-owned entities to honor their contracts; differential treatment of state-owned entities; property disputes; economic instability; currency exchange rates, including the value of the Canadian dollar, the pound sterling, the euro, the Mexican peso, and the Peruvian sol relative to the U.S. dollar; restrictions on the transfer of funds; duties and tariffs; fees; taxes or penalties; transportation delays; import and export controls; labor unrest; security issues; government decisions, orders, mandates, investigations, regulations, and issuances or revocations of permits and authorizations; the effects of military conflicts; and changing regulatory, judicial, and political environments, including changes impacting foreign trade and related matters. The occurrence of any such event could result in the halting, curtailing, or cessation of operations at impacted facilities; commercial restrictions; delay, denial, or cancellation of projects, permits, and authorizations; and increased costs, fines, penalties, and burdens; any of which could result in a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Although we actively seek to manage these risks, we have experienced some of these events in the past and could experience additional events in the future. As noted above, various governments across the world have implemented or indicated the potential for new or revised tariffs, duties, sanctions and other actions with respect to U.S. and foreign trade, manufacturing, and investment. While there is currently a lack of certainty around the likelihood, timing, and details of many such actions, similar events have in the past had, and could again have, an adverse effect on our foreign operations and investments, and the competitiveness of our products globally.

In recent years, a number of climate- and other sustainability-related advocacy groups, both in the U.S. and internationally, have campaigned for government and private action to promote various climate- and other sustainability-related disclosure frameworks, actions, and initiatives. As a result, we have faced, and may continue to face, pressure regarding our efforts and disclosures related to such matters (e.g., GHG emissions reductions/displacements and our methodologies and timelines with respect thereto), including through requests by potential counterparties for certain written declarations or representations, negative publicity, special-interest driven stockholder requests and voting, prescriptive proxy advisory firm and scoring agency expectations and policies, and demands for engagement. The methodologies, standards, and requirements for tracking and reporting many climate- and other sustainability-related matters, such as GHG emissions, have not been standardized or harmonized, and many continue to evolve. Our interpretations of various reporting standards may also differ from those of others. As a result, our metrics, targets, and other disclosures with respect to such matters may not necessarily be calculated or presented in the same manner or be comparable to similarly titled measures presented by us in other contexts, or to disclosures by others. We believe that our disclosures and methodologies related to such matters reflect our business strategy and are reasonable at the time made or used. However, as our business, strategy, low-carbon projects, market and financial conditions, and/or applicable methodologies, standards, or requirements continue to develop and evolve, we may revise or cease reporting or using any or all such disclosures and methodologies if we determine that they are no longer appropriate, or we are otherwise required to do so. We may also be pressured or compelled to disclose information that may not be feasible or obtainable. Any actual or perceived failure by us with respect to our disclosures and actions on such matters, including a revision thereto, could cause reputational and commercial harm, and expose us to litigation or enforcement, among other negative impacts.

In recent years, a number of advocacy groups, both in the U.S. and internationally, have campaigned for government and private action to promote climate-related and other sustainability-related initiatives through activities including public pressure, investment, engagement, and voting practices. These activities have included promoting the divestment of securities of fossil fuel companies, pressuring such companies to commit to future output reductions, to align with net-zero commitments, or to implement costly practices or technology to reduce GHG emissions, and pressuring lenders, insurers, investors, and other market participants to otherwise limit or curtail activities with or involving fossil fuel companies. As a result, we believe some parties have reduced or ceased lending to, investing in, or insuring fossil fuel companies. If these or similar efforts are continued or increased, it could negatively impact our operating costs and capital allocation decisions, as well as our ability to access capital markets, obtain new investment or financing, or to adequately insure our business and operations. These activities have also contributed to increasing societal, investor, and legislative focus and pressure on additional actions and disclosures related to, among others, climate-related matters, GHG emissions and reduction targets, business resilience under the assumptions of demand-constrained scenarios, net-zero ambitions, alignment with third-party frameworks, human capital management, political activities, environmental justice, and racial equity audits. This has included more frequent attempts to effect business or governance changes through mechanisms such as stockholder proposals, vote-no campaigns, exempt proxy solicitations, and other public pressure. As a result, we have faced, and expect to continue 18 18 18 Table of Contents Table of Contents to face, increasing pressure regarding our efforts and disclosures with respect to GHG emissions reductions/displacements (including our methodologies and timelines with respect thereto) and other sustainability-related matters, including negative publicity, prescriptive stockholder requests, and demands for engagement thereon. Sentiment towards many environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related practices has also become increasingly politically charged, and scrutiny and skepticism thereof and “anti-ESG” sentiment has caused, and could continue to cause, additional demands on companies. Responding to such focus and pressure has been, and will likely continue to be, costly and time-consuming. The methodologies, standards, and requirements for tracking and reporting GHG emissions and other sustainability-related matters have not been standardized or harmonized, and many continue to evolve. Our interpretations of various voluntary or required reporting standards may also differ from those of others. As a result, our metrics, targets, and other disclosures with respect to such matters may not necessarily be calculated or presented in the same manner or be comparable to similarly titled measures presented by us in other contexts, or to disclosures by others. We believe that our disclosures and methodologies related to such matters reflect our business strategy and are reasonable at the time made or used. However, as our business, strategy, low-carbon projects, market and financial conditions, and/or applicable methodologies, standards, or requirements continue to develop and evolve, we may significantly revise or cease reporting or using certain such disclosures and methodologies if we determine that they are no longer advisable or appropriate, or we are otherwise required to do so. Any actual or perceived failure by us to achieve our publicly disclosed targets or long-term ambition with respect to GHG emissions reductions/displacements within the timelines we have announced, or at all, or a revision thereof or to our other sustainability-related disclosures, could cause reputational harm, and expose us to litigation or regulatory enforcement, among other negative impacts.

Certain government authorities across the world have, in recent years, imposed, announced, or considered various laws, regulations, policies, and actions designed to facilitate less petroleum-dependent modes of transportation, which could reduce demand for our petroleum-based products and/or all liquid transportation fuels. Such laws, regulations, policies, and actions have in certain instances included increases in fuel economy or efficiency standards; stricter tailpipe emissions standards; low-carbon fuel standards; restrictions and bans on vehicles using internal combustion engines; limitations on using certain petroleum-based products and biofuel feedstocks; and tariffs, duties, and incentives. Under the current administration in the U.S., a number of legal, regulatory, and political actions have been taken or proposed that have resulted in, or may result in, many of these laws, regulations, policies, and actions being modified, rescinded, invalidated, revoked, or eliminated, and others have been delayed or relaxed across the world. However, the ultimate timing and outcome of many such actions are currently unknown and are subject to uncertainty due to pending or future legal, regulatory, and political actions. Certain U.S. state and local governments, foreign governments, and private parties across the world continue to pursue various efforts designed to either directly or indirectly facilitate less petroleum-dependent modes of transportation, or that are otherwise adverse to our industry, including actions and incentives to conserve energy or use renewable energy, as well as those efforts discussed in “We are subject to risks arising from litigation, government action, and mandatory disclosure rules related to climate- and other sustainability-related matters, or aimed at the fossil fuel industry.” Government authorities across the world have announced, imposed, or are considering (as applicable) taxes or penalties on fossil fuel companies for profits, windfalls, margins, or prices above a certain level, carbon border adjustments, fees, and other regulations that are adverse to or restrict refining and marketing operations, could increase costs, and limit profitability. For example, California’s Senate Bill No. 2 (such statute, together with any regulations contemplated or issued thereunder, SBx 1-2) and Assembly Bill No. 1 continue to present considerable uncertainty and risks for us. Mexico has also implemented an informal, nationwide retail price cap on regular gasoline that could be expanded to other fuels, or could become legally binding. These legal, regulatory, and political developments, as well as other similarly focused laws and regulations, such as the California, Quebec and other cap-and-trade programs; the U.K. Emissions Trading Scheme; the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs; the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s Rule 1109.1 – Emissions of Oxides of Nitrogen from Petroleum Refineries and Related Operations; CARB’s Control Measure for Ocean-Going Vessels At Berth Rule and its Airborne Toxic Control Measure for Commercial Harbor Craft; reductions in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards; bans or restrictions on certain chemicals, feedstocks, products, or processes (such as hydrofluoric acid alkylation); and other laws and regulations concerning climate- and environmental-related matters (including GHG emissions), as well as health- and safety-related matters (such as industrial safety ordinances), have in certain instances resulted in, and are expected to continue to result in, increased costs and capital expenditures that impact our ability to effectively and profitably operate and maintain our facilities. These include things such as (i) restrictions on certain refinery operations, (ii) requirements to modify our operations or install new emissions controls or other equipment, and (iii) costs to administer our obligations under the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs. Such risks remain particularly acute in California. Many of these matters and developments are subject to considerable uncertainty due to a number of factors, including technological and economic feasibility, legal challenges, and changes in law, 24 24 24 Table of Contents Table of Contents regulation, or policy, as noted above, and it is not currently possible to predict the ultimate effects thereof on us. However, such events could adversely restrict or affect our refining and marketing operations and limit our profitability; cause us to make changes to our business, strategy, operations, and assets, as well as our current financial and accounting estimates and assumptions; cause a reduction in demand for our products; and result in negative publicity, litigation, and enforcement, each of which could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. See also Note 2 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements.

Many government authorities across the world have imposed, and may impose in the future, laws, regulations, and policies designed to facilitate less petroleum-dependent modes of transportation (e.g., increases in fuel economy or efficiency standards, low-carbon fuel standards, restrictions and bans on vehicles using internal combustion engines, tariffs, duties, tax incentives, and EV subsidies), which could reduce demand for our petroleum-based products and/or all liquid transportation fuels. For example, CARB’s current Scoping Plan identifies strategies to reduce liquid petroleum consumption in California by 94 percent by 2045, and CARB has approved a series of related rulemakings discussed below. The European Union (EU), the U.K., Canada, and Quebec have each adopted what they refer to as “zero-emissions vehicle” mandates and other government authorities across the world, such as Mexico, Quebec, 23 23 23 Table of Contents Table of Contents and other U.S. states have also announced, adopted, or are considering, restrictions on the sale of new internal combustion engine vehicles, stricter tailpipe emissions standards, and/or limitations on or penalties on the use of certain petroleum-based products and biofuel feedstocks. The U.S. federal government under the previous presidential administration was also aggressive in the scope, magnitude, and number of actions it took for the stated purpose of addressing GHG emissions and other environmental matters, including efforts to limit or eliminate petroleum-dependent modes of transportation. For example, the previous administration utilized a “whole of government” approach to climate-related initiatives that sought to organize and deploy the full capacity of the U.S. federal government in novel and coordinated ways to limit or eliminate the use of most petroleum-based products. The previous administration also issued a number of related executive orders seeking to limit or eliminate petroleum-based fuels by imposing mandates of so-called 100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions and setting ambitious decarbonization goals. These actions contributed to a number of U.S. federal rulemakings and other actions, as well as similar actions by U.S. state and local governments, that disfavor petroleum-dependent modes of transportation and in many cases ignore or downplay the full life cycle carbon footprint of EVs, and thereby seek to inappropriately advantage EVs over internal combustion engine vehicles. For example, the EPA issued its “Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards,” revising the GHG emissions standards for light-duty vehicles for 2023 and later model years at a level that cannot be achieved by internal combustion engine vehicles through improvements in combustion efficiency. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) also similarly issued its “CAFE Standards for MY 2024-26 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” increasing the corporate average fuel economy and carbon dioxide standards for certain passenger cars and light-duty trucks such that automakers cannot demonstrate compliance without increasing the sales of EVs. Together, these federal regulations seek to significantly increase the market penetration of EVs and other alternative fuel vehicles and reduce U.S. gasoline consumption. The IRA also includes substantial subsidies to promote EVs and other alternative fuel vehicles. Additionally, in November 2023, the Federal Highway Administration finalized rules that require certain U.S. state departments of transportation and metropolitan planning organizations to establish declining tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions targets for motor vehicles. Moreover, in March 2024, the EPA announced new, more ambitious emissions standards for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles for model years 2027 to 2032 that the agency expects will drive a significant increase in the percentage of new vehicles sold in the U.S. to be EVs or other alternative fuel vehicles. In May 2024, the EPA published final rules intended to sharply reduce emissions of methane and other air pollution from oil and gas operations, and within such rules, the EPA nearly quadrupled its estimate of the “social cost” of carbon dioxide, a measure that is often used by certain U.S. federal agencies as part of their analyses of the costs and benefits of more stringent regulations on GHG emissions. In June 2024, NHTSA also issued final rules increasing both the fuel economy standard for passenger cars and light trucks for model years 2027 to 2031 and the fuel efficiency standards for heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans for model years 2030 to 2035. The current U.S. presidential administration has expressed a different approach with respect to U.S. climate, environmental, and energy policies and has revoked many of the previous administration’s executive orders and directives, and has indicated an intention to modify or eliminate many of the aforementioned laws and regulations, several of which are also currently being litigated, or may be subject to future legal challenges. However, the ultimate timing and outcome with respect to any modifications or eliminations of such laws and regulations, which would likely require action by the U.S. Congress or a federal agency or department, as well as pending or future litigation, are currently unknown and are subject to considerable uncertainty. It is also currently uncertain whether and to what extent any U.S. state and local governments will still pursue the prior administration’s agenda on such matters. 24 24 24 Table of Contents Table of Contents In addition to these U.S. federal measures, in March 2022, the EPA reinstated a waiver of preemption under federal law authorizing California to implement its “Advanced Clean Cars I” rule requiring sales of increasing percentages of alternative fuel vehicles, thereby also reviving other U.S. states’ ability to adopt standards identical to California’s. In November 2022, California approved its “Advanced Clean Cars II” rulemaking, which similarly requires an increasing percentage of “zero-emission” light-duty vehicle sales through 2035, at which time 100 percent of new light-duty vehicle sales in California must be zero-emission vehicles. The EPA recently granted CARB’s request for a waiver of preemption for Advanced Clean Cars II and other preemption waiver requests. Several other U.S. states have already adopted, or are expected to adopt, similar laws, regulations, or mandates. California is also pursuing similar zero-emission vehicle mandates for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles via its “Advanced Clean Trucks” rulemaking and its “Advanced Clean Fleets” rulemaking. Additionally, in July 2023, CARB announced a “Clean Truck Partnership” with various U.S. truck and engine manufacturers and the Truck and Engine Manufacturers Association that is aimed at advancing the development of EVs or other alternative fuel vehicles for the commercial trucking industry regardless of whether the regulatory mandates survive legal challenge. While many of these measures are currently being litigated, or may in the future be subject to legal challenges, we face a risk that automakers will nevertheless move forward with changing their manufacturing and marketing practices. Moreover, there have been various international climate accords and multilateral agreements aimed at reducing GHG emissions. While the current U.S. presidential administration has ordered the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, and many international accords and multilateral agreements are not legally binding, they have in certain instances resulted in, and are expected to continue to result in, additional government and regulatory actions across the world that are adverse to our industry. Incentives to conserve energy or use renewable energy could also negatively impact our industry. Government authorities across the world have also announced, imposed, or are considering, taxes or penalties on fossil fuel companies for profits or windfalls, or margins above a certain level, carbon border adjustments, fees, and other regulations that are adverse to or restrict refining and marketing operations, could increase costs, and limit profitability. For example, California’s Senate Bill No. 2 (such statute, together with any regulations contemplated or issued thereunder, SBx 1-2) and Assembly Bill No. 1 (ABx 2-1), as described in Note 2 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, present considerable uncertainty and risks for us. These legal, regulatory, and political developments, as well as other similarly focused laws and regulations, such as, among others, the California, Quebec and other cap-and-trade programs, the U.K. Emissions Trading Scheme, the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs, the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s Rule 1109.1 – Emissions of Oxides of Nitrogen from Petroleum Refineries and Related Operations, CARB’s Control Measure for Ocean-Going Vessels At Berth Rule and its Airborne Toxic Control Measure for Commercial Harbor Craft, reductions in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, bans or restrictions on certain chemicals, feedstocks, products, or processes (such as hydrofluoric acid alkylation), and other laws related to climate, GHG emissions, or environmental, health, or safety matters, have in certain instances resulted in, and are expected to continue to result in, increased costs and capital expenditures that impact our ability to effectively and profitably operate and maintain our facilities. These include things such as (i) restrictions on certain refinery operations, (ii) and requirements to modify our operations or install new emissions controls or other equipment, and (iii) costs to administer our obligations under the Renewable and Low-Carbon Fuel Programs. Such risks are particularly acute in California due to the pace and scope of anti-fossil fuel developments there. 25 25 25 Table of Contents Table of Contents Many of these matters and developments (including SBx 1-2 and ABx 2-1) are subject to considerable uncertainty due to a number of factors, including technological and economic feasibility, pending or future legal challenges, and potential or future changes in law, regulation, or policy, as noted above, and it is not currently possible to predict the ultimate effects thereof on us. However, such events could adversely restrict or affect our refining and marketing operations and limit our profitability; cause us to make changes with respect to our business plan, strategy, operations, and assets, including our current financial and accounting estimates and assumptions; cause a reduction in demand for our products; and result in negative publicity, litigation, and regulatory enforcement; each of which could materially and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity.

The refining and marketing industry is highly competitive with respect to both feedstock supply and refined petroleum product markets. We compete with many companies for available supplies of crude oil and other feedstocks, as well as for third-party retail outlets for our petroleum-based products, and other customers. We do not produce any of our primary feedstocks (other than DCOs produced by our ethanol plants) and we do not have a company-owned retail network. Some of our competitors, however, obtain a significant portion of their feedstocks from company-owned crude oil production, have extensive networks of retail sites, have different revenue streams (such as from chemicals, midstream, or integrated operations), and operate in different regions. Such competitors are at times able to offset or avoid losses or decreased profitability from downstream operations, or in challenging regions, with such other operations, and may be better positioned to withstand periods of reduced product margins or feedstock disruptions. Some of our competitors also have materially greater financial and other resources than we have and may have a greater ability to respond to the inherent volatility of our industry.

The refining and marketing industry is highly competitive with respect to both feedstock supply and refined petroleum product markets. We compete with many companies for available supplies of crude oil and other feedstocks, and for third-party retail outlets for our petroleum-based products. We do not produce any of our primary feedstocks (except inedible DCOs) and we do not have a company-owned retail network. Some of our competitors, however, obtain a significant portion of their feedstocks from company-owned production, have extensive networks of retail sites, have different revenue streams (such as from chemicals or integrated operations), and operate in different regions. Such competitors are at times able to offset or avoid losses or decreased profitability from downstream operations generally, or in challenging regions, with such other operations, and may be better positioned to withstand periods of depressed product margins or feedstock disruptions. Some of our competitors also have materially greater financial and other resources than we have and may have a greater ability to bear the economic risks inherent to our industry.

We engage in capital and other strategic projects based on many factors, including the forecasted project economics; legal, regulatory, and political environments; the expected return on the capital to be deployed; and the anticipated impact to our future cash flows. Such projects can take many years to complete, during which time such environments or other market conditions may change from our forecast, as has recently occurred with certain low-carbon projects in our Renewable Diesel segment. Supply chain or other market or economic disruptions (including inflation) may also delay projects or increase the costs associated therewith. As a result, such projects may not be completed on schedule or budget, or at all, and may not achieve their expected returns, which could negatively impact our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. In addition, challenges to or opposition of certain fossil fuel and infrastructure projects (including pipelines), as well as certain low-carbon projects (such as carbon sequestration and carbon capture and storage), continue to make the approval and completion of such projects more difficult and costly. Certain of these events have resulted in, and could again result in, the cancellation or restructuring of projects, 21 21 21 Table of Contents Table of Contents costs and charges related thereto, a decreased market outlook, and/or impacts under our capital allocation framework. We also regularly assess our facilities and operations in light of market dynamics and the regulatory environment and have taken, and may in the future take, strategic actions to optimize our portfolio of assets, including those described in Note 2 of Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements with respect to our operations in California. While we expect overall positive results from these strategic actions, there is no assurance that the anticipated benefits will materialize or continue. Unforeseen delays, costs, negative publicity, litigation, enforcement, and other difficulties may arise, including in adapting our other operations and fulfilling our contractual obligations, that negatively impact the actual results and execution of such strategic actions compared to our expectations. Such events could result in changes in our financial and accounting estimates and assumptions and adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity.

We engage in capital and other strategic projects based on many factors, including the forecasted project economics, legal, regulatory, and political environments, and the expected return on the capital to be deployed. Such projects can take many years to complete, during which time such environments or other market conditions may change from our forecast, particularly with respect to low-carbon projects such as those related to SAF and carbon capture and sequestration. Supply chain disruptions may also delay projects or increase the costs associated therewith. As a result, such projects may not be completed on schedule or budget, or at all, and may not achieve their expected returns, which could negatively impact our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. In addition, challenges to or opposition of fossil fuel infrastructure projects continue to make the approval and completion of such projects more difficult and costly. Despite various government and third-party support for and acknowledgement of the importance of certain low-carbon fuels and technologies, such as carbon capture and sequestration, there has also been growing regional political, environmental, and other opposition to many such projects. Such opposition may affect grants of the relevant permits or authorizations by government or judicial officials, or grants of easements or rights-of-way by land owners, and has previously resulted in, and could again result in, permits and other authorizations being challenged, delayed, denied, revoked, appealed, or granted subject to onerous conditions. In certain 22 22 22 Table of Contents Table of Contents instances, this has resulted in, and could again result in, the cancellation or restructuring of projects and costs and charges related thereto.

Certain employees at five of our U.S. refineries, our Canada and U.K. refineries, and our terminal in Montreal, are covered by collective bargaining or similar agreements, which generally have unique and independent expiration dates. Workers at any of our facilities that are not currently represented by a union or covered by similar agreements could vote for such representation or coverage in the future. To the extent we are in negotiations for labor agreements at any time, there is no assurance an agreement will be reached without a strike, lockout, work stoppage, or other labor action or disruption, and such events have occurred for certain periods in the past, and may occur again in the future. Any such prolonged event at our facilities or otherwise impacting our operations could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Labor-related laws and regulations have in certain instances also resulted in, and may again result in, reduced labor availability and higher costs. Our business could also be negatively impacted if we are unable to recruit, train, and retain adequate personnel, including those with key skills or knowledge. Inflation has also caused, and may in the future cause, increases in employee-related costs. 31 31 31 Table of Contents Table of Contents

Certain employees at five of our U.S. refineries, as well as at each of our Canada and U.K. refineries and terminal in Montreal, are covered by collective bargaining or similar agreements, which generally have unique and independent expiration dates, and workers at any of our facilities that are not currently represented by a union could vote for such representation in the future. To the extent we are in negotiations for labor agreements at any time, there is no assurance an agreement will be reached without a strike, work stoppage, or other labor action, and such actions have occurred for certain periods in the past. Any prolonged strike, work stoppage, or other labor action at our facilities or otherwise impacting third parties that support our operations could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity. Future labor legislation also could result in labor shortages and higher costs. An inability to recruit, train, and retain adequate personnel, or the loss or departure of personnel with key skills or deep institutional knowledge, may negatively impact our business. Inflation has also caused, and may in the future cause, increases in employee-related costs.